# Commentaria in Secundam Secundae Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae, Quibus, Quae ad Fidem, Spem, et Charitatem Spectant, Clarissime Explicantur (*Commentary on the Second Part of the Second Part of St. Thomas Aquinas, in which those things pertaining to Faith, Hope, and Charity are most clearly explained*)

**by Domingo Báñez (Domingo Banez), 1584**

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## Quaestio I, Art. X

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| *Latin* |  | *English* |
| Dubitatur secundo principaliter, an summus Pontifex possit errare in definiendis rebus fidei? |  | The second principal doubt is whether the Supreme Pontiff can err in defining matters of faith. |
| Arguitur primo pro parte affirmatiua. Qui dicitur summus Pontifex in ecclesia, non est certus petri successor, ergo errare potest. Antecedens probatur. Quia a tempore Urbani VI. coepit schisma in ecclesia, quod spatio annorum quadraginta perdurauit, quo tempore defuncti sunt veri Cardinales summi pontificis electores, & in eorum loco alij Cardinales creati fuerunt a summis Pontificibus dubijs & incertis, ac proinde non fuit legitima electio Martini V. qui in Constantiensi concilio electus est, a quo deinceps continuata successione habuit ecclesia Romana summos pontifices usque ad Gregorium XIII. ergo omnes Romani Episcopi sunt incerti successores Petri. |  | The first argument is made for the affirmative position. He who is called the Supreme Pontiff in the Church is not a certain successor of Peter; therefore, he can err. The antecedent is proven thus: Because from the time of Urban VI, a schism began in the Church which lasted for a period of forty years, during which time the true Cardinals who were electors of the Supreme Pontiff died, and in their place other Cardinals were created by doubtful and uncertain Supreme Pontiffs. Consequently, the election of Martin V, who was elected in the Council of Constance, was not legitimate, and from him the Roman Church has continued to have Supreme Pontiffs in unbroken succession up to Gregory XIII. Therefore, all Roman Bishops are uncertain successors of Peter. |
| Arguitur secundo. Non est certum secundum fidem, quod Gregor. XIII. sit verus summus Pontifex, ergo non erit certum, quod hic quem nos summum Pontificem arbitramur non possit errare. Antecedens probatur. Quia non est secundum fidem certum, quod ille sit baptizatus; Si autem non est baptizatus, non est verus summus pontifex, ergo. Et confirmatur a simili. Quamvis enim certum sit, quod sacerdos rite consecratus possit consecrare sacramentum eucharistiae, tamen quod iste homo sit sacerdos, & hoc sit verum sacramentum ab illo consecratum, non est certum secundum fidem, ergo similiter quamvis sit certum secundum fidem, quod si quis est verus pontifex, non possit errare, tamen quod iste homo singularis sit verus summus Pontifex, non est certum secundum fidem, ac proinde non est certum, quod iste non possit errare. |  | It is argued secondly: It is not certain according to faith that Gregory XIII is the true Supreme Pontiff; therefore, it will not be certain that this one whom we consider the Supreme Pontiff cannot err. The antecedent is proven because it is not certain according to faith that he is baptized; if, however, he is not baptized, he is not the true Supreme Pontiff, therefore [the conclusion follows]. And this is confirmed by a similar argument: For although it is certain that a properly consecrated priest can consecrate the sacrament of the Eucharist, nevertheless that this particular man is a priest, and that this is a true sacrament consecrated by him, is not certain according to faith. Therefore, similarly, although it is certain according to faith that if someone is the true Pontiff he cannot err, nevertheless that this particular individual is the true Supreme Pontiff is not certain according to faith, and consequently it is not certain that he cannot err. |
| Arguitur tertio Papa potest esse haereticus, ergo potest definire falsum in rebus fidei, sicut ipse sentit. Patet consequentia. Quia alias videretur miraculum, quod definiret aliter, quam ipse sentit. Antecedens vero probatur. Quia Anastasius summus Pontifex fuit haereticus, ut habetur in dist. 19. cap. Anastas. Item Honorius fuit etiam haereticus, sicut definitur in Concilio Constantinopol. 6. actione. 13. & 18. Ratione etiam probatur. Nam fides in summo Pontifice voluntaria est, & eiusdem rationis sicut in aliis hominibus; sed in quolibet alio homine est amissibilis, ergo in Pontifice. |  | It is argued thirdly: The Pope can be a heretic; therefore, he can define falsehood in matters of faith, according to what he himself believes. The consequence is evident, because otherwise it would seem miraculous that he would define something contrary to what he himself believes. The antecedent, however, is proven because Anastasius, the Supreme Pontiff, was a heretic, as is stated in distinction 19, chapter “Anastasius.” Likewise, Honorius was also a heretic, as is defined in the Sixth Council of Constantinople, actions 13 and 18. It is also proven by reason: For faith in the Supreme Pontiff is voluntary and of the same nature as in other men; but in any other man it is capable of being lost, therefore [it is capable of being lost] in the Pontiff. |
| Arguitur quarto Summus Pontifex quantumlibet catholicus nisi necessariam diligentiam adhibeat, errare potest; sed potest esse negligens in eiusmodi sufficienti diligentia adhibenda, ergo. Maior probatur. Quia Spiritus sanctus non assistit Pontifici per immediatam revelationem expresse illuminando illum, quid definire debeat, eo pacto quo olim sacris scriptoribus assistebat, sed assistit Pontifici quaerenti veritatem per disputationem & inquisitionem & consilium, in quibus potest Papa negligenter procedere, & per consequens errare. |  | It is argued fourthly: The Supreme Pontiff, however Catholic he may be, can err unless he employs the necessary diligence; but he can be negligent in employing such sufficient diligence, therefore [he can err]. The major premise is proven. Because the Holy Spirit does not assist the Pontiff through immediate revelation expressly illuminating him as to what he ought to define, in the manner by which He once assisted the sacred writers, but assists the Pontiff who seeks truth through disputation and inquiry and counsel, in which the Pope can proceed negligently, and consequently err. |
| Arguitur quinto Infallibile iudicium circa doctrinam fidei ex suprema regula ecclesiae desumendum est; sed Concilium est superior regula quam Pontifex, ergo definitio Pontificis non est infallibilis circa fidem. Minor probatur. Quia ita definitum est in Concilio Constantiensi, Sess. 4. & 5. Et quod magis urget, ipse Martinus V, in Sess. 45. eiusdem Concilii confirmavit omnia, quae in ipso Concilio decreta sunt ad fidem pertinentia. Confirmatur, ex definitione Concilii Basiliensis, Sess. 2. & 3. & 33. Et ratione probatur. Quia potestas quae est in summo Pontifice, ab ecclesia derivata videtur, siquidem ecclesia eligit summum Pontificem. |  | It is argued fifthly: The infallible judgment concerning the doctrine of faith must be derived from the supreme rule of the Church; but a Council is a superior rule than the Pontiff, therefore the definition of the Pontiff is not infallible concerning faith. The minor premise is proven. Because it was thus defined in the Council of Constance, Sessions 4 and 5. And what is more pressing, Martin V himself, in Session 45 of the same Council, confirmed everything which was decreed in that Council pertaining to faith. This is confirmed by the definition of the Council of Basel, Sessions 2, 3, and 33. And it is proven by reason. Because the power which is in the Supreme Pontiff seems to be derived from the Church, since the Church elects the Supreme Pontiff. |
| Arguitur sexto Si summus Pontifex non potest errare, dum solus ipse de rebus fidei decernit, frustra consumeretur opera in congregandis Conciliis tot sumptibus & laboribus & superfluis disputationibus; consequens est haereticum, ergo. |  | It is argued sixthly: If the Supreme Pontiff cannot err when he alone decrees on matters of faith, labor would be wasted in assembling Councils with such expenses and efforts and superfluous disputations; the consequent is heretical, therefore [the antecedent must be rejected]. |
| Arguitur septimo Multi summi Pontifices aliis Pontificibus contradixerunt, ut patet ex multis capitulis & decretis, quae in unum colligit Iohannes Turrecremata lib. 2. Summae c. 112. Et Caietanus in 2. parte Apologiae de auctoritate Papae & Concilii, c. 13. & in Opuscul. 27. questionum, quest. ult. & Magister Cano lib. 6. de locis Theologicis cap. 1. ergo summus Pontifex errare potest. Confirmatur. Quia ut in eisdem locis videre licet, saepe improprie & insalute multi Pontifices sacras literas exponunt, ergo &c. |  | It is argued seventhly: Many Supreme Pontiffs have contradicted other Pontiffs, as is evident from many chapters and decrees, which Johannes Turrecremata collects together in book 2 of his Summa, chapter 112. And Cajetan [does likewise] in the second part of his Apology on the Authority of the Pope and Council, chapter 13, and in his Opusculum of 27 Questions, the final question, and Master Cano in book 6 of De Locis Theologicis, chapter 1. Therefore, the Supreme Pontiff can err. This is confirmed because, as may be seen in these same places, many Pontiffs often explain the sacred scriptures improperly and unsoundly, therefore, etc. |
| In hac difficultate dissolvenda nobis controversia est & cum haereticis & cum catholicis. Haeretici quidem omnes negant, in summo Pontifice talem esse auctoritatem. Sed inter eos haereticos Lutherus & eius sequaces sunt, qui maxime debachantur contra Pontificis dignitatem. Sed Erasmus etiam super Epistolam D. Hieronymi ad Damasum, & in libello de ratione verae Theologiae ait, fenestram aperire ad perniciem verae pietatis eos, qui docent, Romanum Pontificem errare non posse, quoties de moribus & fide decernit. Sed valeat Erasmus de haeresi vehementer semper suspectus. Ecce Gratianus catholicus distinct. 19. cap. Ita dns. §. Hoc ait, ait, Anastasius secundus errasse. Item Thomas Vualdensis libr. 2. doctrinalis fidei antiq. capit. 19. & Turrecremata lib. 4. summae, parte 2. capite 26. idem sentiunt. Et Adrianus in 4. sententiar. quaest. ultima de Confirmatione, & Doctores Parisienses, quales sunt Gerson, Almain, & Ocham, quos sequitur Alfonsus de Castro adversus haereses lib. 1. c. 2. & 4. & 8. |  | In resolving this difficulty, we face controversy both with heretics and with Catholics. Indeed, all heretics deny that such authority exists in the Supreme Pontiff. But among these heretics, Luther and his followers are those who most violently rage against the dignity of the Pontiff. Even Erasmus, in his commentary on St. Jerome’s Epistle to Damasus, and in his small book on the method of true Theology, says that those who teach that the Roman Pontiff cannot err whenever he makes determinations concerning morals and faith open a window to the destruction of true piety. But let Erasmus, who was always vehemently suspected of heresy, be dismissed. Behold the Catholic Gratian in distinction 19, chapter “Ita Dominus,” §. “Hoc ait,” states that Anastasius the Second erred. Likewise, Thomas Waldensis in book 2 of his “Doctrinale Fidei Antiquae,” chapter 19, and Torquemada in book 4 of his “Summa,” part 2, chapter 26, hold the same opinion. And Adrian in book 4 of his “Sentences,” in the final question on Confirmation, and the Parisian Doctors, such as Gerson, Almain, and Ockham, whom Alfonso de Castro follows in his work “Against Heresies,” book 1, chapters 2, 4, and 8. |
| PRO decisione huius gravissimae quaestionis, ante omnia praemittendum est, quod nomine summi Pontificis aut Papae intelligimus Pastorem universalem Ecclesiae, imo totius orbis, qui sit Vicarius Christi in terris, & Petri Apostoli in plenitudine successor. Et merito quidem huiusmodi epithesis ac vocabulis significatur. Quoniam Vicarius is proprie dicitur, qui absentis vices gerit: successor vero proprie dicitur, qui in functi locum, vel alterius a sua dignitate depositi sufficitur, & substituitur: sicuti Episcopus qui succedit defuncto Episcopo, vel ab Episcopatu deposito. Cum ergo Christus Dominus absens sit secundum praesentiam visibilem, quamvis sit praesens in sacramento: Petrus vero Apostolus mortuus sit, ideo merito noster Pontifex, Christi Vicarius & Petri successor nuncupatur. Quamobrem Ecclesia non est monstrum multorum capitum, quoniam haec duo capita ita se habent, ut alterum alteri subordinet; est enim Christus caput in caelis habens vicarium in terris. Hoc doctrina insinuatur ab Apostolo ad Hebraeos 7. dum inquit: Et alii quidem plures sunt facti sacerdotes, idcirco quod morte prohiberentur hic autem (videlicet Christus) eo quod manet in aeternum, sempiternum habet sacerdotium. Ac si diceret, quod adhuc in caelis existens est summus sacerdos & summus Pontifex, & unicum Ecclesiae suae caput. Cui unitati nihil derogat, quod in terris sit alius homo, qui caput Ecclesiae militantis dicatur, non propria virtute & merito, sed vice Christi influens, quod necessaria sunt ut Ecclesia militans & peregrina hostes vincat, & ad patriam perveniat. |  | FOR the decision of this most grave question, it must first of all be established that by the name of Supreme Pontiff or Pope we understand the universal Pastor of the Church, indeed of the whole world, who is the Vicar of Christ on earth and the successor of the Apostle Peter in the fullness of power. And indeed he is rightfully designated by such epithets and terms. For “Vicar” is properly called one who acts in the place of one who is absent; while “successor” is properly called one who is appointed and substituted in the place of one who has died, or of another who has been deposed from his dignity—just as a Bishop who succeeds a deceased Bishop, or one removed from the Episcopate. Since therefore Christ the Lord is absent according to visible presence, although He is present in the sacrament, and since the Apostle Peter is dead, our Pontiff is rightfully called the Vicar of Christ and the successor of Peter. For this reason, the Church is not a monster of many heads, since these two heads are related in such a way that one is subordinate to the other; for Christ is the head in heaven having a vicar on earth. This doctrine is implied by the Apostle in Hebrews 7, when he says: “And they indeed were made many priests, because by reason of death they were not permitted to continue; but this one (namely Christ), because he continues forever, has an everlasting priesthood.” As if to say that even while existing in heaven, He is the high priest and Supreme Pontiff, and the only head of His Church. This unity is in no way diminished by the fact that on earth there is another man who is called the head of the militant Church—not by his own virtue and merit, but acting in the place of Christ, providing what is necessary for the militant and pilgrim Church to conquer its enemies and reach its homeland. |
| Advertendum est secundo loco, catholice fidei esse dogma, summum Pontificatum divino iure institutum esse in Ecclesia a Christo Domino Iohannis 21. cum dixit Petro: Pasce oves meas. Id quod promiserat antea Matthaei 19. cum dixerat Petro: tu es Petrus, & super hanc Petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam. Gubernatio itaque Ecclesiae est monarchia, & non optimatum potentia. Neque enim potest Ecclesia duos aut plures Pontifices instituere qui gubernent, sicut olim antiqua Roma duobus Consulibus gubernabatur; sed necessario & divino iure per unicum monarcham Christi Vicarium gubernari debet. De qua re agitur in quarto sentent. distinct. 18. de Clavibus. Vel etiam distin.24. de sacramento Ordinis. Et vide Turre cremata libr.2. suae Summae, & Rossens. contra Luthe. artic.25. Et Iohan. Ekium in Enchiridione de primatu Petri, & Albertum Pyghium libr.4. de Ecclesi. hierarchia, & Caieta. in Opuscul. de autoritate Papae & conciliij. Et in Apologia de eodem, & in Opuscul. de primatu Ecclesiae Romanae, & Fratrem Dominicum de Soto in 4. distinct.20. q.1. art.4. & d.24. q.2. ar.5. |  | It should be noted in the second place that it is a dogma of the Catholic faith that the Supreme Pontificate was instituted by divine law in the Church by Christ the Lord in John 21, when He said to Peter: “Feed my sheep.” This He had promised earlier in Matthew 19, when He said to Peter: “You are Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church.” Therefore, the governance of the Church is a monarchy, and not an aristocracy. For the Church cannot establish two or more Pontiffs who govern, as ancient Rome was once governed by two Consuls; but necessarily and by divine law it must be governed by a single monarch, the Vicar of Christ. This matter is treated in the fourth book of Sentences, distinction 18, concerning the Keys; or also distinction 24, concerning the sacrament of Orders. And see Torquemada in the second book of his Summa, and Rochester [John Fisher] against Luther, article 25, and Johann Eck in his Enchiridion on the primacy of Peter, and Albert Pighius in book 4 on Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and Cajetan in his Opuscula on the authority of the Pope and councils, and in his Apology on the same subject, and in his Opuscula on the primacy of the Roman Church, and Brother Dominic de Soto in book 4, distinction 20, question 1, article 4, and distinction 24, question 2, article 5. |
| Praeterea tertio notandum est, valde temerarium esse, & scandalosum multarumque haeresium fomentum, asserere, quod concilium sit supra Papam, & quod huic simile est, quod autoritas, quae est in Papa ad pascendum & regendum Ecclesiam, non sit immediate a Christo, sed derivata ab Ecclesia, qui eligit Pontifice. Vbi non audeo dicere, hoc esse dogma haereticum. Quia nondum invenio expresse definitum in aliquo Concilio aut Pontificis decretali. Et insuper Parisienses Doctores, qui ita sentiunt, concilium esse supra Papam, tolerantur. Verum est tamen, quod Caietanus in presenti articulo refert definitionem Lateranen. Concilij sub Leone X. Cui ipse Caietanus interfuit, ubi definitum est expresse, Papam esse supra concilium. Veruntamen hoc Concilium Lateranens. III. non est receptum in tota Gallia, neque a Parisiensibus Doctoribus: quin potius ab illo appellaverunt ad concilium futurum. Et illorum ratio erat, quia Galliae Episcopi non interfuerunt illi Concilio propter bellum, quod tunc temporis erat inter Iulium Secundum, qui concilium congregabat, & Regem Galliae. Et quanvis illa appellatio fuerit scandalosa, & temeraria, & multarum haeresium initium, non tamen ita aperte haeresis dananda est. Et preterea videmus, quod quanvis in Concilio Florentino sit expresse definitum, primatum Petri & Romanae sedis necessarium esse ad pascendam Ecclesiam, non tamen expresse definit, quod Pontifex sit supra Concilium: id quod etiam adverterunt Doctores supracitati. |  | Furthermore, it should be noted thirdly that it is highly reckless and scandalous, and an encouragement to many heresies, to assert that a council is above the Pope, and similarly, that the authority which is in the Pope to shepherd and govern the Church does not come directly from Christ, but is derived from the Church, which elects the Pontiff. Here I dare not say that this is a heretical dogma, because I have not yet found it expressly defined in any Council or Papal decretal. Furthermore, the Doctors of Paris who hold this view that a council is above the Pope are tolerated. It is true, however, that Cajetan in the present article cites the definition of the Lateran Council under Leo X, at which Cajetan himself was present, where it was expressly defined that the Pope is above the council. Nevertheless, this Third Lateran Council has not been received throughout all of France, nor by the Doctors of Paris; rather, they appealed from it to a future council. And their reasoning was that the Bishops of France did not attend that Council because of the war which existed at that time between Julius II, who convened the council, and the King of France. And although that appeal was scandalous and reckless, and the beginning of many heresies, it should not be so openly condemned as heresy. Moreover, we see that although in the Council of Florence it was expressly defined that the primacy of Peter and of the Roman See is necessary for shepherding the Church, it did not expressly define that the Pontiff is above the Council—a point which the aforementioned Doctors have also noted. |
| Notandum est quarto, Romanum Pontificem iure divino esse summum ecclesiae pontificem, ita sane ut Episcopatus urbis & Episcopatus orbis ex Christi Domini institutione idem sit. Hoc documentum confirmant multis & magnis argumentis a Caietano in Opusculo de primatu Ecclesiae Romanae, & a Magistro Cano libro sexto ex locis capit. quarto. & per tria capita sequentia. Nihilominus hoc documentum non est ita certum, sicut praecedentia. Quapropter aliqui Doctores graves nostri temporis aiunt, Episcopum Romanum esse quidem summum Pontificem, non tamen iure divino haec duo esse coniuncta, ita ut non possit Apostolica sedes transferri ad Episcopatum alterius urbis. Ita sentit Frater Dominicus de Soto ubi supra: imo ait, non esse necessarium, ut summus pontifex sit antistes alicuius ecclesiae particularis. Sed nihilominus ipsemet Dominicus de Soto in calce articuli inquit: Haec tamen ita dicta sint, ut Romanis pedibus meum submittam caput. |  | It should be noted, fourthly, that the Roman Pontiff is, by divine law, the supreme pontiff of the Church, such that the Episcopate of the city [of Rome] and the Episcopate of the world are one and the same by Christ the Lord’s institution. This doctrine is confirmed by many substantial arguments by Cajetan in his treatise “On the Primacy of the Roman Church,” and by Master Cano in the sixth book of his De Locis Theologicis, chapter four, and throughout the three following chapters. Nevertheless, this doctrine is not as certain as the preceding ones. For this reason, some eminent doctors of our time assert that the Bishop of Rome is indeed the Supreme Pontiff, yet these two offices are not joined by divine law in such a way that the Apostolic See could not be transferred to the episcopate of another city. This is the opinion of Brother Dominic de Soto in the above-mentioned work; indeed, he says that it is not necessary for the Supreme Pontiff to be the prelate of any particular church. Nevertheless, Dominic de Soto himself at the end of the article states: “Let these things, however, be said in such a way that I submit my head to Roman feet.” |
| Notandum est quinto, quod neque summus pontifex neque tota ecclesia possunt novum articulum aut novum dogma condere quantum ad substantiam, sicut neque possunt novum sacramentum instituere: imo multo minus, quia fides est praecipuum in Ecclesia fundamentum. Quapropter etiam ipse Christus Dominus quanvis instituerit nova sacramenta, non tamen instituit, aut fecit novum fidei articulum quantum ad substantiam. |  | It should be noted, fifthly, that neither the Supreme Pontiff nor the entire Church can establish a new article or new dogma with respect to substance, just as they cannot institute a new sacrament—indeed, much less so, because faith is the principal foundation in the Church. Therefore, even Christ the Lord Himself, although He instituted new sacraments, did not establish or create a new article of faith with respect to substance. |
| Quemadmodum enim universae veritates scientiarum continentur in hoc principio, quodlibet est, vel non est: ita nulla veritas fidei est, quae quantum ad substantiam non continetur in illo principio, quod proponitur ab Apostolo ad Hebr.11. Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere, quia est, et quod inquirentibus se remunerator est. Ex quo sequitur, quod cum quaerimus, an summus Pontifex possit errare in rebus fidei definiendis, intelligimus, in rebus fidei definitione sua explicandis. Id quod explicatur a nobis exemplo. Si quis consulat moralem philosophum de aliqua morali dubitatione, et ille respondeat veritatem iuxta moralia principia, tunc profecto philosophus ille potius explicat, quod latebat, quam sit ipse autor veritatis. Ad hunc modum quando summus Pontifex definit, aliquid esse de fide tenendum, habet se ut explicantem latentem veritatem, non ut autorem veritatis. Nihilominus est magnum discrimen, quoniam Philosophus ille non iuridice declarat, aut cogit interrogantem, ut sentiat, quod ipse dicit: Ecclesia vero vel Pontifex ita iuridice explicat, ut obliget Christianum sive interrogantem, ut credat, et sentiat esse certum secundum fidem, quod ipse declaraverit esse tenendum. Atque hoc pacto intelligatur D. Thom. in articulo, quando ait, quod nova editio symboli pertinet ad autoritatem summi Pontificis, videlicet, quantum ad novam explicationem. Ex quo sequitur, perperam haereticos adversum nos objicere, quod summus Pontifex faciat novam fidem. Sequitur etiam, vehementer falli eos, qui aiunt, quod Papa non habet aliam potestatem circa res fidei explicandas, quam reliqui Doctores Ecclesiae, cum tamen summus Pontifex habeat iurisdictionem pascendi oves Christi doctrina fidei. |  | Just as all truths of the sciences are contained in this principle—that a thing either is or is not—so too there is no truth of faith which, as regards its substance, is not contained in that principle set forth by the Apostle in Hebrews 11: “He who comes to God must believe that He exists and that He rewards those who seek Him.” From this it follows that when we inquire whether the Supreme Pontiff can err in defining matters of faith, we understand this to mean in explaining matters of faith through his definition. This we explain by an example. If someone consults a moral philosopher about some moral question, and that philosopher responds with the truth according to moral principles, then that philosopher is certainly explaining what was hidden rather than being himself the author of the truth. In this manner, when the Supreme Pontiff defines something to be held as a matter of faith, he acts as one who explains a hidden truth, not as the author of that truth. Nevertheless, there is a great difference, because that Philosopher does not juridically declare or compel the inquirer to accept what he says; the Church or Pontiff, however, explains juridically in such a way as to oblige the Christian or inquirer to believe and to accept as certain according to faith what he has declared must be held. And in this manner St. Thomas should be understood in his article, when he says that a new edition of the creed pertains to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, namely, with regard to new explanation. From this it follows that heretics wrongly object against us that the Supreme Pontiff creates a new faith. It also follows that those are gravely mistaken who say that the Pope has no power concerning the explanation of matters of faith beyond that possessed by other Doctors of the Church, when in fact the Supreme Pontiff has jurisdiction to feed Christ’s sheep with the doctrine of faith. |
| Ultimo notandum est, quod Papa dupliciter potest veritatem aliquam definire. Uno modo sicut doctor et persona privata. Quo pacto Innocent.III edidit commentaria super Decretales. Altero modo ut pastor et iudex universalis Ecclesiae; quae tamen iudiciaria potestas duplex est. Altera qua procedit Pontifex secundum communem usum iudicum iuxta allegata et probata, tam in causis criminalibus, quam in civilibus Christianae reipublicae, excommunicando, vel absolvendo, vel ligando. Haec tamen potestas, quae plenissime residet in summo Pontifice, participatur nihilominus ab aliis Episcopis in suis dioecesibus: imo vero a summo pontifice potest committi, et subdelegari huiusmodi potestas iurisdicendi supra totum orbem. Est autem altera potestas definitiva ad declarandas veritates fidei, quae licet sit potestas iurisdictionis, est tamen altioris ordinis et rationis, quam praecedens, quia convenit Pontifici ex assistentia Spiritus sancti, quae nulli alii promissa est. De qua potestate solet verti in dubium apud Theologos scolasticos, an possit delegari, etsi de prioris potestatis subdelegatione nulla sit dubitatio. |  | Finally, it should be noted that the Pope can define a truth in two ways. In one way, as a doctor and private person. In this manner, Innocent III produced commentaries on the Decretals. In another way, as the pastor and universal judge of the Church; this judicial power, however, is twofold. One is that by which the Pontiff proceeds according to the common practice of judges in accordance with allegations and proofs, both in criminal cases and in civil matters of the Christian commonwealth, by excommunicating, or absolving, or binding. This power, which resides most fully in the Supreme Pontiff, is nevertheless shared by other Bishops in their dioceses; indeed, this power of jurisdiction over the whole world can be committed and subdelegated by the Supreme Pontiff. There is, however, another definitive power for declaring truths of faith, which, although it is a power of jurisdiction, is nevertheless of a higher order and nature than the preceding one, because it belongs to the Pontiff through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is promised to no one else. Concerning this power, scholastic Theologians often raise the question of whether it can be delegated, even though there is no doubt about the subdelegation of the former power. |
| Quaestio ergo plena est, an Pastor universalis Ecclesiae, qui nunc de facto est Romanus Pontifex, possit in rebus fidei definiendis errare. Nam quod possit errare secundum potestatem iudicium ordinariam saltem ex ignorantia facti, aut etiam ex malitia absolvendo aut condemnandu reum, res est apud omnes constituta. |  | The complete question, therefore, is whether the universal Pastor of the Church, who is now in fact the Roman Pontiff, can err in defining matters of faith. For it is established among all that he can err according to the ordinary judicial power, at least from ignorance of fact, or even from malice in absolving or condemning the accused. |
| Respondetur ergo ad quaestionem, et sit prima conclusio. Summus Pontifex in quantum Doctor et persona priuata errare potest in rebus fidei, siue errore in culpato, siue culpabili etiam cum pertinacia, ita ut sit haereticus. Haec conclusio est contra Albertum Pyghium Campensem ubi supra, & contra quosdam recentiores Theologos. Est tamen sententia omnium antiquorum & pontificum Romanorum & scholasticorum Doctorum ante Albertum Pyghium, imo & post illum grauiores Doctores ita sentiunt. Vide Caietanum in libro de primatu ecclesiae Romanae, & locis supra citatis. In quibus, tanquam certissimum supponit, Papam fieri posse haereticum, & disputat, an pleno iure definat esse Papa. Hoc ipsum sentit Turrecrem. ubi supra. hoc docuerunt sapientissimi nostri temporis Magistri Salmanticae sacrae Theologiae primarij professores in suis commentarijs super istum art. 10. videlicet, Victoria, Soto, & Cano, ut patet lib. 6. de locis cap. ult. Nunc ergo probat conclusio. Primo. Quia non est licitum Theologo praesertim in re graui nouas opiniones inducere, nisi magna & necessaria ratione cogente: sed nostra conclusio est antiqua & communis opinio, contraria vero noua est, & absque manifesta & urgenti ratione asseritur, ergo non est admittenda. Primus enim author huius opinionis fuit Pyghius lib. 4. de Ecclesiastica hierarc. 8. parum topica & probabili ratione ductus. Est enim voluntarie & gratis assertum, ut cum primum quis creatur summus pontifex, statim confirmetur in fide, ita ut etiam si velit, non possit errare, errore personali. Probat secundo. Nam quamuis opposita opinio praeferre videat quandam pietatem, & pontificiam dignitatem extollere, tamen re bene inspecta parum pia est, an potius minuit pontificiam dignitatem, ergo nostra conclusio est tenenda. Antecedens probat. Quia nihil est pium, nisi quod idem verum est; sed opinio Alberti est minus vera, ac proinde minus pia. |  | Therefore, we respond to the question with this first conclusion: The Supreme Pontiff, insofar as he is a Doctor [of the Church] and a private person, can err in matters of faith, whether through inculpable error or culpable error even with pertinacity, such that he could become a heretic. This conclusion stands against Albert Pighius of Kampen as cited above, and against certain more recent theologians. However, it represents the unanimous opinion of all ancient [authorities], Roman pontiffs, and scholastic doctors before Albert Pighius; indeed, even after him, the more serious doctors hold this view. See Cajetan in his book on the primacy of the Roman Church and in the places cited above. In these works, he takes it as most certain that a Pope can become a heretic, and discusses whether he would cease to be Pope by full right. Torquemada holds the same opinion as cited above. This has been taught by the most learned masters of our time at Salamanca, the primary professors of sacred theology in their commentaries on this article 10, namely Victoria, Soto, and Cano, as is evident in book 6 of De Locis, final chapter. Now, therefore, the conclusion is proven. First, because it is not permissible for a theologian, especially in grave matters, to introduce new opinions unless compelled by substantial and necessary reasoning. But our conclusion represents the ancient and common opinion, while the contrary is new and asserted without manifest and urgent reasoning; therefore, it should not be admitted. For the first author of this [contrary] opinion was Pighius, in book 4 of his Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, chapter 8, led by reasoning that is scarcely topical or probable. For it is voluntarily and gratuitously asserted that as soon as someone is created Supreme Pontiff, he is immediately confirmed in the faith, such that even if he wished, he could not err through personal error. Second, it is proven that although the opposing opinion might seem to manifest a certain piety and to exalt pontifical dignity, nevertheless, upon careful examination, it is scarcely pious and rather diminishes pontifical dignity; therefore, our conclusion must be upheld. The antecedent is proven because nothing is pious unless it is also true; but Albert’s opinion is less true, and therefore less pious. |
| Confirmat. Nam qui tenent illam sententiam, ut eam tueantur, infirmant duas Synodos generales receptas ab ecclesia, & negant etiam illarum decreta, ut statim videbimus. Arguitur ergo tertio. Nam Victor I, Marcellinus, Liberius, Honorius, Anastasius II fuerunt summi pontifices, & errauerunt in fide, ergo. De Victore quidem asserit haereticum fuisse Eusebius lib. 5. Historiae ecclesiastica cap. penult. De Marcellino vero omnes historiae clamant, thurificasse idolis, & condemnatum fuisse in Synodo trecentorum Episcoporum. Liberium autem refert Hieronymus in Chronicis, & Platina consensisse in haeresim Arianam. Anastasium vero Gratian. dist. 19. cap. Anastasius ait, consensisse Nestorianis, & communicasse Achario. Honorium vero anathematizauit 6. Synodus generalis act. 13. & 18. & Tharasius in 7. Synodo generali act. 3. & Epiphanius act. 6. & tota Synodus act. ultima. Et quod magis urget, tres Romani pontifices, Agatho, & Leo II. & Adrianus I tulerunt sententiam in Honorium tanquam in haereticum. Agathonis quidem sententia habetur in epistola ad 6. Synodum generalem actione 4. Leonis vero sententia habetur in epistola, qua eandem Synodum confirmauit. Ubi ita inquit; Anathematizamus Honorium, qui hanc Apostolicam Ecclesiam non Apostolicae traditionis doctrina illustrauit, sed profana proditione immaculatam fidem subuertere conatus est. Adriani autem sententia habet act. 7. in 8. Synodo generali. Ubi ait, quod licet Honorio ab Orientalibus anathema sit dictum, hoc tamen fuit, quoniam accusatus erat de haeresi, in qua licitum est minoribus A de superioribus iudicare. |  | Confirmed. For those who hold that opinion, in order to defend it, invalidate two General Synods received by the Church, and also deny their decrees, as we shall soon see. Therefore, it is argued thirdly: Victor I, Marcellinus, Liberius, Honorius, and Anastasius II were Supreme Pontiffs, and they erred in matters of faith, therefore [the proposition is proven]. Concerning Victor, Eusebius asserts in Book 5 of his Ecclesiastical History, in the penultimate chapter, that he was a heretic. Regarding Marcellinus, all histories proclaim that he offered incense to idols and was condemned in a Synod of three hundred bishops. Jerome in his Chronicles, and Platina, report that Liberius consented to the Arian heresy. Concerning Anastasius, Gratian in Distinction 19, chapter “Anastasius,” states that he agreed with the Nestorians and communicated with Acacius. As for Honorius, he was anathematized by the Sixth General Synod in Acts 13 and 18, and by Tarasius in the Seventh General Synod in Act 3, and by Epiphanius in Act 6, and by the entire Synod in the final Act. And what presses more urgently, three Roman Pontiffs—Agatho, Leo II, and Adrian I—passed judgment on Honorius as a heretic. Agatho’s judgment is contained in his epistle to the Sixth General Synod in Act 4. Leo’s judgment is found in the epistle by which he confirmed the same Synod, where he states thus: “We anathematize Honorius, who did not illuminate this Apostolic Church with the doctrine of Apostolic tradition, but by profane betrayal attempted to subvert the immaculate faith.” Adrian’s judgment is contained in Act 7 of the Eighth General Synod, where he says that although anathema was pronounced upon Honorius by the Orientals, this was because he was accused of heresy, in which case it is permitted for inferiors to judge their superiors. |
| Huic nihilominus argumento, quod fecimus, multipliciter respondent fautores contrariae sententiae. Negant primo fidem historiarum. Et profecto quanuis hac via possit excusari Victor ab haeresi, quoniam Paulianistae & Artemonitae mentiti sunt, asserentes illum esse suae factionis consortem, ut bene probat Euseb. ubi supra. Item posset excusari ab haeresi Marcellinus, quoniam se constat idolis sacrificasse merito credendum est: postea enim poenitentia ductus martyr effectus est, & canonizatus. |  | Nevertheless, the supporters of the contrary opinion respond to this argument we have made in multiple ways. First, they deny the credibility of historical accounts. And indeed, although by this approach Victor can be excused from heresy, since the Paulianists and Artemonites lied when asserting that he was an associate of their faction, as Eusebius well proves in the passage cited above. Likewise, Marcellinus could be excused from heresy, since it is firmly established that he sacrificed to idols, which is deserving of belief: for afterward, moved by penitence, he became a martyr and was canonized. |
| (De Liberio autem & Anastasio, an fuerint haeretici, maneat fides apud Gratianum & Platinam.) Tamen de Honorio I. non habent, quod respondeant, nisi quod exemplaria textae & septimae Synodi generalis corrupta sint per falsarios, cum tamen ab Ecclesia ut authentica circumferantur, & legantur. Iam vero modestius respondent secundo quidam, concilia, summosque Pontifices errare posse, cum iudicent secundum ordinariam iudicum potestatem iuxta allegata & probata. Atque ita aiunt, contra Honorium falso testes attulisse offerentes epistolam eius nomine, quam aut ipsi finxerunt esse Honorij, aut certe ex odio vitiarunt illam. In qua continebatur haeresis Eutychetis, & Dioscoriae, propterea pontifices & concilia condemnaverunt Honorium re vera innocentem, sed iuxta allegata & probata haereticum iudicatum. Respondent tertio aliquanto modestius, Honorium quidem pontificem consensisse in sententiam Eutychetis, & Dioscori non tamen fuisse haereticum, quia nondum illa sententia erat damnata ut haeresis, atque proinde Honorius non fuit privatus. Nihilominus damnatus est tanquam haereticus, quia Ecclesia non iudicat de interioribus: erat autem externa testimonia sufficientia ad illum condemnandum, praesertim quia tunc temporis iam Honorius e vita excesserat, nec potuit se purgare, neque quisquam alius pro illo respondit. |  | (Regarding Liberius and Anastasius, whether they were heretics, let the testimony rest with Gratian and Platina.) However, concerning Honorius I, they have no response except that the texts of the Sixth and Seventh General Councils were corrupted by falsifiers, even though these texts are circulated and read by the Church as authentic. Now, some respond more modestly in a second way, saying that councils and Supreme Pontiffs can err when they judge according to ordinary judicial power based on allegations and proofs presented. And thus they claim that witnesses falsely presented against Honorius a letter in his name, which either they themselves fabricated as being from Honorius, or which they certainly corrupted out of hatred. This letter contained the heresy of Eutyches and Dioscorus, and therefore the pontiffs and councils condemned Honorius, who was truly innocent, but judged a heretic according to the allegations and proofs presented. They respond in a third, somewhat more modest way, that Pope Honorius indeed consented to the opinion of Eutyches and Dioscorus, but was nevertheless not a heretic, because that opinion had not yet been condemned as heresy, and therefore Honorius was not deprived [of his office]. Nonetheless, he was condemned as a heretic, because the Church does not judge internal matters: however, the external testimonies were sufficient to condemn him, especially because at that time Honorius had already departed from life, and could not defend himself, nor did anyone else respond on his behalf. |
| Verum si huiusmodi solutiones sophisticas admittamus, multo maiora inconuenientia sequuntur, quam si fateamur, Honorium fuisse haereticum. Etenim ex prima solutione destruitur autoritas duarum vel trium Synodorum generalium: imo omnium, si semel admittamus, licitum esse nobis asserere, exemplaria conciliorum esse depravata. |  | Indeed, if we admit such sophistical solutions, much greater inconveniences follow than if we were to confess that Honorius was a heretic. For from the first solution, the authority of two or three General Synods is destroyed—indeed of all of them, if we once admit that it is permissible for us to assert that the texts of councils have been corrupted. |
| De secunda vero solutione, quanuis admittatur esse possibile, quod pontifices & concilia errent, quando eo pacto procedunt; tamen temere dicitur, quod de facto errant in re grauissima, & quod praestiterint dignam diligentiam in examinandis testibus, inquirentes, esset ne illa epistola Honorij, an non. Et certe ridiculum est, quod post nongentos annos Albertus Pyghius inuenerit, testes illos falsos atque falsarios fuisse. |  | Regarding the second solution, although it may be admitted as possible that popes and councils can err when they proceed in such a manner, nevertheless it is rash to say that they did in fact err in a most serious matter, and that they exercised due diligence in examining witnesses, inquiring whether that letter was Honorius’s or not. And certainly it is ridiculous that after nine hundred years Albertus Pighius discovered that those witnesses were false and falsifiers. |
| Sed esto ita disputationis gratia, quod illi pontifices in condemnatione Honorij errauerint, tamen negari non potest, quin pro constanti habuerint in haeresim summum pontificem posse incidere, alioquin accusationem de haeresi nullatenus admisissent. |  | But let it be so for the sake of argument, that those popes erred in the condemnation of Honorius; nevertheless, it cannot be denied that they held it as established that the Supreme Pontiff can fall into heresy, otherwise they would in no way have admitted an accusation of heresy. |
| Et denique ex tertia solutione etiam sequitur aduersus eosdem autores, quod saltem summus pontifex possit errare, errore inculpato, quod est contra priuilegium, quod ipsi aiunt colligi ex illo Lucae 22. Ego rogaui pro te Petre, ut non deficiat fides tua. Ubi aiunt, quod nullo modo errare possit pontifex errore culpato neque inculpato: eo vel maxime quod ad Ecclesiae utilitatem parum retulerit, cp summus Pontifex erret in fide culpate vel inculpate; utroque enim modo errare faciet gregem sibi commissum, si sicut ipse sentit, tanquam fidem catholicam aliis tradiderit. Hactenus de illorum solutionibus. |  | And finally, from the third solution it also follows, contrary to these same authors, that at least the Supreme Pontiff can err through an inculpable error, which is against the privilege that they say is inferred from Luke 22: “I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail.” Where they assert that the pontiff can in no way err, neither through culpable nor inculpable error; especially since it would make little difference for the Church’s benefit whether the Supreme Pontiff errs in faith culpably or inculpably; for in either case he will cause the flock entrusted to him to err if he hands down to others what he himself believes as Catholic faith. Thus far concerning their solutions. |
| Nunc vero ad quasdam speciales obiectiones contra nostram conclusionem breuiter respondendum est. Obiiciunt enim primo, priuilegium illud, quod ipsi intelligunt Lucae 22. Ego rogaui pro te Petre, non fuisse concessum soli Petro, sed etiam omnibus Petri successoribus; sed si referatur ad Petrum, intelligitur, ita ut fides Petri neque personalis, neque publica deficere potuerit, ergo eodem modo intelligendum est, si referatur ad Petri successores. |  | Now, however, we must briefly respond to certain specific objections against our conclusion. For they object, firstly, that the privilege which they understand from Luke 22, “I have prayed for you, Peter,” was not granted to Peter alone, but also to all of Peter’s successors; but if it refers to Peter, it is understood such that neither Peter’s personal nor public faith could fail, therefore it must be understood in the same way if it refers to Peter’s successors. |
| Minor patet ex supradictis. Maior vero probatur. Quia illud priuilegium non fuit collatum Petro, quatenus erat Apostolus alioquin Apostolus Thomas nunquam fidem amisisset, sed datum est illi, quatenus erat uniuersalis Ecclesiae Pastor, ac proinde transit huiusmodi priuilegium ad Apostolos Petri successores. |  | The minor premise is evident from what has been said above. The major premise, however, is proven thus: Because that privilege was not conferred upon Peter insofar as he was an Apostle (otherwise the Apostle Thomas would never have lost his faith), but it was given to him insofar as he was the universal Pastor of the Church, and consequently this privilege passes to the Apostles who are Peter’s successors. |
| Huic obiectioni respondetur, quod huiusmodi priuilegium duo continebat. Alterum, quod spectabat ad Petri personalem excellentiam, videlicet, quod propria fides eius non deficeret. Alterum, quod pertinebat ad officium summi pontificis & Christi Vicarii, videlicet, ut in proponenda doctrina totius ecclesiae & in confirmandis fratribus publica fides Petri non deficeret. |  | To this objection it is answered that such a privilege contained two aspects. One pertained to Peter’s personal excellence, namely, that his own personal faith would not fail. The other pertained to the office of the Supreme Pontiff and Vicar of Christ, namely, that in proposing doctrine for the whole Church and in confirming the brethren, the public faith of Peter would not fail. |
| Dicimus ergo, quod Petri successores succedunt illi in hoc priuilegio, quantum attinet ad officium summi pontificatus, & communem Ecclesiae gubernationem: non autem sunt haeredes illius priuilegii in iis, quae spectabant ad Petri personalem dignitatem. Quemadmodum etiam omnes Apostoli acceperunt a Christo Domino potestatem uniuersalem gubernandi Ecclesiam ubique terrarum, & non solum quilibet illorum in propria dioecesi, & nihilominus Episcopi Apostolorum successores non haereditarunt illam priorem & generalem potestatem, sed solum illam particularem erga propriam dioecesim. |  | We say, therefore, that Peter’s successors succeed him in this privilege insofar as it pertains to the office of the Supreme Pontificate and the common governance of the Church; they are not, however, heirs to that privilege in matters that pertained to Peter’s personal dignity. Just as all the Apostles likewise received from Christ the Lord universal power to govern the Church throughout the world, and not merely each of them in his own diocese, yet nonetheless the Bishops, as successors of the Apostles, have not inherited that prior and general power, but only that particular power over their own diocese. |
| Secunda obiectio illorum est. Quia videtur illis, ad suauem Dei dispositionem gubernantis Ecclesiam attinere, ut summus pontifex nequeat esse haereticus. Nam ipse iudex debet esse regula sui & obliqui, atque quilibet iudex profert sententiam iuxta proprium iudicium: esset autem quasi violentum, ut summus pontifex haereticus definiret aliud, quam ipse sentit, ergo. |  | Their second objection is this: It seems to them that it pertains to God’s gentle disposition in governing the Church that the Supreme Pontiff cannot be a heretic. For the judge himself ought to be the standard of what is straight and what is crooked, and any judge pronounces sentence according to his own judgment. It would be, as it were, a violation of nature for a heretical Supreme Pontiff to define something other than what he himself believes, therefore, etc. |
| Huic obiectioni respondemus, quod eadem via probaretur, quod summus pontifex non possit esse peccator vel idololatra, quia ipse debet iudicare contra peccatores & idololatras. Dicendum ergo quod quemadmodum ad suauem dispositionem & ordinem uniuersi pertinet, quod aqua sursum ascendat, cum opus fuerit, ne detur vacuum, quamuis secundum propriam & specificam inclinationem deorsum propensa sit; ita etiam ad suauem Ecclesiae uniuersalis dispositionem & ordinem pertinet, quod qui est Vicarius Christi in terris, recipiat ab ipso Christo talem influentiam, cum opus fuerit, ut in definienda veritate fidei sequatur infallibiliter doctrinam Christi, etiam si ipse pontifex alias ex propria malitia aut ignorantia erret. In qua re magis ostenditur Dei omnipotentia, qui per instrumentum etiam errantis profert infallibilem veritatem. |  | To this objection we respond that by the same reasoning one could prove that the Supreme Pontiff cannot be a sinner or an idolater because he himself must judge against sinners and idolaters. Therefore it must be said that just as it pertains to the harmonious disposition and order of the universe that water may ascend upward when necessary, lest a vacuum be created, although according to its own proper and specific inclination it tends downward; so also it pertains to the harmonious disposition and order of the universal Church that he who is the Vicar of Christ on earth receives from Christ himself such influence, when necessary, that in defining matters of faith he infallibly follows the doctrine of Christ, even if the pontiff himself might otherwise err through his own malice or ignorance. In this matter, God’s omnipotence is more clearly demonstrated, as He pronounces infallible truth through the instrument of one who may otherwise be in error. |
| Tertia obiectio est. Nam si concedamus (aiunt) Papam non posse haereticum esse, magnas euadimus difficultates & quaestiones, videlicet. Utrum papa propter haeresim amittat pontificiam dignitatem, & a quo nam sit iudicandus? Quae quaestiones a Theologis difficile expediuntur. Huic obiectioni respondetur, indignum esse viro Theologo, quaestionis alicuius difficultate fractum veritatem deserere, sed magis decet veritatem abditam inquirere, & dilucidare. Quamobrem sit nobis secunda conclusio in ordine huius disputationis. |  | The third objection is this: For if we concede (they say) that the Pope cannot be a heretic, we avoid many difficulties and questions, namely: Whether the pope loses his pontifical dignity on account of heresy, and by whom he should be judged? These questions are difficult for theologians to resolve. To this objection we respond that it is unworthy of a theologian to abandon truth because he is overwhelmed by the difficulty of a question; rather, it is more fitting to seek out and elucidate hidden truth. Therefore, let this be our second conclusion in the order of this disputation. |
| Secunda conclusio, Si Pontifex summus in haeresim incidat, non statim amittit pontificiam dignitatem, antequam ab ecclesia deponatur. Haec conclusio est contra Turrecrematam libr. 2. Summae. cap. 112. ad 7. argumentum. Ubi ait, quod si Romanus pontifex efficiatur haereticus, ipso facto quo cadit a fide Petri, cadit a cathedra & sede Petri, & per consequens iudicium, quod faceret talis haereticus, non esset iudicium Apostolicae sedis. Et in libr. 4. p. 2. capit. 18. 19. & 20. tenet eandem sententiam. Et haec sententia dicitur a Caietano in Opusculo de autoritate papae & concilij capit. 18. esse multorum virorum. Sed ipse Caietanus tenet nostram conclusionem ibidem capit. 17. & 18. |  | Second conclusion: If the Supreme Pontiff should fall into heresy, he does not immediately lose his pontifical dignity before being deposed by the Church. This conclusion stands against Turrecremata in book 2 of his Summa, chapter 112, in response to the 7th argument, where he asserts that if the Roman Pontiff becomes a heretic, by the very fact that he falls from the faith of Peter, he falls from the chair and seat of Peter, and consequently, any judgment made by such a heretic would not be a judgment of the Apostolic See. And in book 4, part 2, chapters 18, 19, and 20, he holds the same opinion. And this opinion is said by Cajetan in his treatise “On the Authority of the Pope and Council,” chapter 18, to be held by many men. But Cajetan himself holds our conclusion in the same work, chapters 17 and 18. |
| Et probatur primo. Alij Episcopi si haeretici sint, adhuc retinent suam dignitatem Episcopalem, donec deponantur, ergo & summus pontifex. Probatur consequentia. Quia summus pontifex non debet esse deterioris conditionis, quam alij Episcopi. Antecedens vero probatur. Quia Ecclesia vel papa, ad quem spectat depositio haeretici episcopi, non potest iudicare de internis actibus, potest autem episcopus esse haereticus haeresi solum interiori, ergo talis episcopus adhuc retinet suam dignitatem episcopalem. |  | First proof: Other bishops, if they are heretics, still retain their Episcopal dignity until they are deposed; therefore, so does the Supreme Pontiff. The consequence is proven because the Supreme Pontiff should not be of worse condition than other bishops. The antecedent is proven because the Church or Pope, to whom belongs the deposition of a heretic bishop, cannot judge internal acts, yet a bishop can be a heretic by interior heresy alone; therefore, such a bishop still retains his episcopal dignity. |
| Et confirmatur. Quia alias sequeretur, quod si episcopus vel etiam summus pontifex mentalis haereticus postea rediret ad meliorem mentem, teneretur se prodere, aut sedem propriam pontificatus relinquere, quia non esset verus praelatus, nisi de novo eligeretur, quae omnia durissima essent. |  | This is confirmed because otherwise it would follow that if a bishop, or even the Supreme Pontiff, were a mental heretic and later returned to better mind, he would be obliged to betray himself or leave his own pontifical seat, since he would not be a true prelate unless newly elected—all of which would be extremely harsh consequences. |
| Probatur secundo. Si pontifex semel haereticus postea sit paratus corrigi, non est deponendus, ut etiam adversarij admittunt, ergo non desinit esse pontifex. Patet consequentia. Nam si semel desijsset esse verus pontifex sive iure divino sive humano, non posset iterum in sede collocari nisi per novam electionem. |  | Second proof: If a pontiff who was once a heretic is later prepared to be corrected, he is not to be deposed, as even our adversaries admit; therefore, he does not cease to be pontiff. The consequence is evident. For if he had once ceased to be true pontiff, whether by divine or human law, he could not be placed again in the seat except through a new election. |
| Probatur tertio. Periculosum esset, si totius ecclesiae gubernatio penderet ab unius hominis fide, quam utrum ipse habeat in corde, nemo potest agnoscere, & magna inconvenientia sequerentur. Primo quidem, quia hoc pacto possent omnes pontificiae definitiones infirmari non solum ab haereticis, sed etiam a catholicis. Quis enim esset certus, an ipse pontifex habeat veram fidem? Deinde consequenter omnes leges & statuta, quae a pontifice dimanarent, simili ratione infirmarentur. Et denique omnia inconvenientia, quae sequuntur ex haeresi asserentium, per quodlibet mortale peccatum praelatum amittere suam dignitatem, sequuntur etiam ex opinione contraria conclusioni nostrae, ut v. g. quod haberemus dubios pontifices & ignotos, & omnia versarentur in confusione quadam Babylonica. |  | Third proof: It would be perilous if the governance of the entire Church depended upon the faith of one man, which no one can recognize whether he has it in his heart, and great inconveniences would follow. First indeed, because in this way all pontifical definitions could be invalidated not only by heretics but also by Catholics. For who would be certain whether the pontiff himself has true faith? Then, consequently, all laws and statutes emanating from the pontiff would be similarly weakened. And finally, all the inconveniences that follow from the heresy of those asserting that a prelate loses his dignity through any mortal sin also follow from the opinion contrary to our conclusion, such as, for example, that we would have doubtful and unknown pontiffs, and all things would be turned into a certain Babylonian confusion. |
| Sed contra nostram conclusionem secundam & primam objiciunt oppositum opinantes. Nam cum primum summus pontifex incidit in haeresim, desinit esse caput universalis Ecclesiae, ergo definit esse pontifex. Consequentia patet, & probatur antecedens. Quia summus pontifex statim definit esse membrum. |  | But those holding the opposite opinion object against our second and first conclusion. For when the Supreme Pontiff first falls into heresy, he ceases to be the head of the universal Church, therefore he ceases to be pontiff. The consequence is evident, and the antecedent is proven because the Supreme Pontiff immediately ceases to be a member. |
| Ad hanc obiectionem facile respondebimus ex doctrina superius tradita, dum ecclesiae definitionem explicaremus. Dicimus ergo nunc, quod summus pontifex dicitur esse caput ecclesiae, non ratione sanctitatis aut fidei quam habet, sic enim non influit in reliqua membra; sed dicitur esse caput ratione officii ministerialis ad gubernandam ecclesiam definiendo veritatem, statuendo leges, ministrando sacramenta, quae omnia exterius exercentur secundum ecclesiasticam hierarchiam visibilem, & ut ita dixerim palpabilem. |  | To this objection we shall easily respond from the doctrine delivered above, when we were explaining the definition of the Church. We now say, therefore, that the Supreme Pontiff is said to be the head of the Church not by reason of the sanctity or faith that he possesses (for in this way he does not influence the other members), but he is said to be the head by reason of his ministerial office for governing the Church by defining truth, establishing laws, and administering sacraments, all of which are externally exercised according to the visible ecclesiastical hierarchy, and, if I may say so, tangible hierarchy. |
| Caeterum quod ipse pontifex propter haeresim desinat esse membrum Christi, eo quod definit recipere ab illo spiritualem influentiam ad propriam sanctitatem definatam, hoc non impedit, quominus pontifex dicatur esse potissimum membrum ecclesiae, videlicet caput, quantum ad Ecclesiasticam gubernationem. Quemadmodum, & praetor ciuitatis dicitur esse caput reipublicae. Adnotauimus ubi supra, quod cum ratio membri metaphorice dicatur, potest esse metaphorae diuersa consideratio. Atque secundum unam considerationem pontifex non est membrum Christi aut ecclesiae, & secundum alteram erit membrum Christi & ecclesiae. |  | However, the fact that the pontiff himself ceases to be a member of Christ because of heresy, insofar as he ceases to receive from Him spiritual influence directed toward his own sanctity, does not prevent the pontiff from being called the most important member of the Church, namely the head, with respect to ecclesiastical governance. Just as the magistrate of a city is called the head of the republic. We noted above that since the concept of member is used metaphorically, different considerations of the metaphor are possible. And according to one consideration, the pontiff is not a member of Christ or of the Church, while according to another, he will be a member of Christ and of the Church. |
| Tertia conclusio In publico fidei iudicio non est distinguenda Apostolica sedes ab Apostolico praeside vel summo pontifice, neque Romanas sedes a pontifice Romano. Haec conclusio est contra sententiam Alfonsi de Castro, qui lib.1. contra haereses cap.8. ait, Apostolicam sedem continere non solum summum pontificem, sed etiam simul Cardinalium collegium, atque ita summum pontificem per se solum errare posse. |  | Third Conclusion: In public judgment concerning faith, the Apostolic See should not be distinguished from the Apostolic president or Supreme Pontiff, nor the Roman See from the Roman Pontiff. This conclusion stands against the opinion of Alfonso de Castro who, in his first book against heresies, chapter 8, asserts that the Apostolic See comprises not only the Supreme Pontiff but also the College of Cardinals, and thus the Supreme Pontiff alone can err. |
| Nihilominus probatur nostra conclusio. Quia priuilegium concessum Petro ut Christi Vicario in confirmandis fratribus, concessum est ipsi soli absque aliorum Apostolorum consortio, ergo vera est conclusio. Probatur antecedens Matth.16. ubi referentibus aliis Apostolis falsas sententias hominum de Christo, ut v.g. quod esset Elias, aut Ieremias, aut unus ex Prophetis, rursusque interroganti Christo; Vos autem quem me esse dicitis? Respondit Petrus ante omnes, & dixit: Tu es Christus filius Dei viui; ac proinde meruit audire; Beatus es Simon Bar-Iona, quia caro & sanguis non reuelauit tibi, sed pater meus qui est in caelis. Et ego dico tibi, quia tu es Petrus, & super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam &c. Ubi Christus dominus promisit Petro tanquam suo Vicario infallibilem in decernendis rebus fidei autoritatem, quam non promisit aliis Apostolis. |  | Nevertheless, our conclusion is proven. Because the privilege granted to Peter as Christ’s Vicar in confirming the brethren was granted to him alone without the association of the other Apostles; therefore, our conclusion is true. The antecedent is proven from Matthew 16, where, after the other Apostles reported false opinions of men concerning Christ—for example, that He was Elijah, or Jeremiah, or one of the Prophets—and Christ again inquiring, “But who do you say that I am?” Peter answered before all others, saying: “You are the Christ, the Son of the living God”; and consequently deserved to hear: “Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven. And I say to you that you are Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church,” etc. Here Christ the Lord promised to Peter, as His Vicar, infallible authority in deciding matters of faith, which He did not promise to the other Apostles. |
| Praeterea Lucae.22. dicitur: Simon ecce Satan expetiuit vos, ut cribraret sicut triticum; ego autem oraui pro te, ut non deficiat fides tua, & tu aliquando conuersus confirma fratres tuos. Ubi satis singulariter sermo Christi refertur ad Petrum tanquam ad Vicarium, qui futurus erat aliorum iudex & regula. Non enim frustra dicit, singulariter se pro Petro orasse, ut non deficeret fides eius: ad quem pertinebat fratres confirmare. Quae omnia ad successores Petri referenda videntur, qui ex officio debent Cardinales & uniuersos fideles confirmare in fide. Nam profecto Apostolos ipsos Christus Dominus in fide & charitate sine Petri adminiculo, Spiritu sancto misso de caelo, confirmauit. |  | Furthermore, in Luke 22 it is said: “Simon, behold Satan has desired to have you all, that he might sift you like wheat; but I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail, and when you have turned again, strengthen your brethren.” Here Christ’s discourse is quite particularly directed to Peter as the Vicar, who was to be the judge and rule for others. For He did not say in vain that He had prayed singularly for Peter, that his faith would not fail: to whom it pertained to strengthen the brethren. All of which seems to refer to Peter’s successors, who by virtue of their office must confirm the Cardinals and all the faithful in the faith. For indeed, Christ the Lord confirmed the Apostles themselves in faith and charity without Peter’s assistance, by sending the Holy Spirit from heaven. |
| Tandem Iohann.21. Ubi Petrus institutus est a Christo Domino universalis ecclesiae Pastor, ad quem spectaret oves Christi salubri doctrina pascere, praemisit Christus ante huiusmodi institutionem haec verba; Simon Iohannis diligis me plus his? Ubi comparavit Petrum cum reliquis Apostolis, ut ostenderet, se specialiter soli Petro tanquam suo Vicario totius ecclesiae pontificatum committere. |  | Finally, in John 21, where Peter was instituted by Christ the Lord as universal Pastor of the Church, to whom it would belong to feed Christ’s sheep with wholesome doctrine, Christ prefaced this institution with these words: “Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?” Here He compared Peter with the rest of the Apostles, to show that He was specially committing the pontificate of the whole Church to Peter alone as His Vicar. |
| Probatur secundo conclusio nostra. Cum fideles accedunt ad sedem Apostolicam de rebus fidei instruendi; cum etiam concilia ab eadem sede suorum decretorum confirmationem postulant, non adeunt Cardinales, neque interrogant nisi solum pontificem, qui in Apostolica sede praesidet, ergo vera est conclusio de soli pontifice. Quia solus summus pontifex, etiam excluso cardinalium collegio, est Christi Vicarius & Petri successor (quis enim hoc negare audeat?) ergo ipse solus errare non potest. |  | Our conclusion is proven secondly. When the faithful approach the Apostolic See to be instructed in matters of faith, and when councils request confirmation of their decrees from the same See, they do not approach the |
| Ex dictis colligitur, quod autoritas haec definiendi res fidei primo residet in summo pontifice: deinde in Apostolica sede. Hoc patet. Quia ut dudum ostendebamus, privilegium firmitatis in fide concessum est soli Petro, & deinde ad eius sedem Apostolicam derivatur. Imo vero si proprie loquamur, nihil aliud est sedes Apostolica, quam successor Petri in praelatione & primatu gubernationis ecclesiae. |  | From what has been said, it is concluded that this authority to define matters of faith resides first in the Supreme Pontiff, and then in the Apostolic See. This is evident. For as we have shown earlier, the privilege of firmness in faith was granted to Peter alone, and then it flows to his Apostolic See. Indeed, if we speak properly, the Apostolic See is nothing other than the successor of Peter in the prelature and primacy of the governance of the Church. |
| Quarta conclusio. In publico fidei iudicio non potest summus pontifex errare. Hanc conclusionem asserit D. Tho. hic, & infra q. 11. art. 2. ad 3. & lib. 4. contra Gent. cap. 76. & Opuscul. 1. contra errores Graecorum cap. 33. & c. 65. usque ad 70. & Thomas Waldensis lib. 4. Doctrinalis antiqui fidei ca. 47. & 48. & Turrecremata libr. 2. Summae a c. 107. usque ad 112. & Albertus Pychius lib. 4. Ecclesiast. hierarc. a ca. 2. usque ad 8. & Iohannes Ekius in Enchirid. de primatu Petri & Caietanus ubi supra maxime in Opusculo de primatu Romanae Ecclesiae. ca. 12. & 13. & 14. & Magister Cano de locis lib. 6. per totum, praecipue a cap. 9. usque ad 7. qui omnes autores plurima testimonia recitant Pontificum & Sanctorum Patrum & antiquorum conciliorum hanc veritatem asserentium. Quo circa arbitror, hanc conclusionem tanquam Apostolicam traditionem esse tenendam. Et quidem ut talis haberetur ab omnibus fidelibus, nisi a tempore concilii Constantien. in agro Domini inimicus homo, idest diabolus, zizaniam superseminasset. Etenim usque ad illa tempora soli Graeci errabant in hac parte. Atque ita D. Th. in Opusculo citato hunc errorem tanquam Graecorum singularem narrat. Et proculdubio, si quaestio haec ad concilium legitimum deferretur, non dubito, quin praedicta conclusio definiretur tanquam vera fides, & contraria anathematizaretur. Quia potest ostendi contrarium, quod iam est definita a Leone X. in bulla contra Lutherum articulo 8. in quo Lutherus aiebat, quod etiam si papa & maior ecclesiae pars aliquid sentiret, non esset peccatum neque haeresis oppositum tenere; etiam si talis sententia definiretur tenenda tanquam de fide Catholica. |  | Fourth conclusion. The Supreme Pontiff cannot err in a public judgment of faith. This conclusion is asserted by St. Thomas here, and below in question 11, article 2, reply to objection 3, and in book 4 of Contra Gentiles, chapter 76, and in Opusculum 1 against the errors of the Greeks, chapter 33, and chapters 65 through 70. It is also affirmed by Thomas Waldensis in book 4 of Doctrinale Antiquitatum Fidei, chapters 47 and 48, and by Torquemada in book 2 of his Summa, from chapter 107 through 112, and by Albert Pighius in book 4 of Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, from chapter 2 through 8, and by Johann Eck in his Enchiridion on the primacy of Peter, and by Cajetan in the above-mentioned work, especially in his Opusculum on the primacy of the Roman Church, chapters 12, 13, and 14, and by Melchior Cano in his work De Locis Theologicis, book 6 throughout, especially from chapter 9 through 7. All these authors cite numerous testimonies from Popes, Holy Fathers, and ancient councils asserting this truth. Therefore, I believe that this conclusion must be held as an Apostolic tradition. And indeed, it would be held as such by all the faithful, had not the enemy, that is, the devil, sown weeds in the Lord’s field since the time of the Council of Constance. For until those times, only the Greeks erred in this matter. And thus St. Thomas, in the cited Opusculum, relates this error as peculiar to the Greeks. And without doubt, if this question were brought before a legitimate council, I do not doubt that the aforementioned conclusion would be defined as true faith, and the contrary would be anathematized. Because the contrary can be shown to have already been defined by Leo X in the bull against Luther, article 8, in which Luther claimed that even if the Pope and the greater part of the Church held a certain position, it would be neither a sin nor heresy to hold the opposite view, even if such a position were defined as to be held as Catholic faith. |
| Qui articulus cum reliquis omnibus ibidem contentis damnatur a pontifice, & excommunicatur quicunque illos docere praesumpserit. Probatur praeterea conclusio ex illo Deuter. 17. ubi dicitur: Si difficile & ambiguum apud te iudicium esse prospexeris &c. Et iudicium intra portas tuas videris verba variari, surge, & ascende ad locum, quem elegerit Dominus tuus, veniesque ad sacerdotes Leuitici generis, & ad iudicem, qui fuerit illo tempore: quaerentesque ab illis, iudicent deinceps nullus in terrescat superbia. Hinc sumitur argumentum a minori ad maius. Si summus synagogae pontifex, de doctrina interrogatus errare non poterat in definiendis controuersiis; ergo multo minus summus pontifex ecclesiae Christi Vicarius & Petri successor poterit errare. Et confirmatur. Magis enim necessarium est, ut ecclesia habeat huiusmodi regulam infallibilem quam olim synagoga, quae tantum constabat ex una gente & natione, ubi pauciores controuersiae oriri poterant. Nunc enim ecclesia noua ex multis & variis nationibus collecta pluribus controuersiis turbari potest, ergo infallibilis definiendi regula in summo pontifice nunc magis quam olim necessaria est. |  | This article, along with all others contained therein, is condemned by the pontiff, and whoever presumes to teach them is excommunicated. Furthermore, the conclusion is proven from Deuteronomy 17, where it says: “If you find a case too difficult or ambiguous for judgment, etc. And if you see that the opinions within your gates vary, arise and go up to the place which the Lord your God has chosen, and come to the priests of the Levitical race and to the judge who is in office at that time; and inquiring of them, they shall pronounce judgment, and henceforth let no one become puffed up with pride.” From this, an argument is drawn from the lesser to the greater. If the high priest of the synagogue, when questioned about doctrine, could not err in defining controversies, then much less can the Supreme Pontiff of the Church, the Vicar of Christ and successor of Peter, err. And this is confirmed. For it is more necessary that the Church have such an infallible rule than formerly the synagogue, which consisted only of one people and nation, where fewer controversies could arise. Now the new Church, gathered from many and various nations, can be disturbed by more controversies; therefore, an infallible rule of definition in the Supreme Pontiff is now more necessary than formerly. |
| Praeterea probatur eadem conclusio. Quia D. Petrus errare non poterat in definiendis controuersiis de fide, sed summus pontifex succedit Petro in eadem autoritate, ergo non potest errare. Maior patet ex testimoniis citatis argumento primo pro conclusione praecedenti. Minor patet. Quia sicut Christus Dominus instituit ecclesiam perpetuo duraturam usque ad consummationem seculi, ita ut portae inferi non praeualeant aduersus eam: ita videtur instituisse in ipso Petro ipsiusmet successorem, qui pasceret, & regeret ecclesiam, ut definitum est in Concilio Constantiensi Sessione 8. contra Vuitcleff, Sessione 15. errore 1. & 27. contra Iohannem Hus, & in Bulla Martini Quinti, quae habetur in fine concilii, ubi condemnatur tamquam error, quod papa non sit Christi Vicarius & successor. |  | Moreover, the same conclusion is proven. Because St. Peter could not err in defining controversies of faith, but the Supreme Pontiff succeeds Peter in the same authority, therefore he cannot err. The major premise is evident from the testimonies cited in the first argument for the preceding conclusion. The minor premise is evident. Because just as Christ the Lord established the Church to endure perpetually until the consummation of the world, so that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it: so He seems to have instituted in Peter himself his own successor, who would feed and govern the Church, as was defined in the Council of Constance, Session 8 against Wycliffe, Session 15, errors 1 and 27 against John Hus, and in the Bull of Martin V, which is found at the end of the council, where it is condemned as an error that the pope is not the Vicar of Christ and successor. |
| Item probatur conclusio. Quia tantam debet summus pontifex in ecclesia autoritatem habere, quanta est necessaria, ut in unitate fidei fideles contineantur, sed ad huiusmodi unitatem necessaria est in summo pontifice infallibilis definiendi potestas, ergo habet illam. Maior est manifesta in omni republica bene instituta. Minor vero probatur. Quia in ecclesia frequenter oriuntur quaestiones de fide, at vero si non esset in ecclesia iudex unus, qui eas lites componeret, essent in ecclesia perpetuae dissensiones in doctrina fidei, ac proinde ecclesiae unitas periret. Ergo quod si quis dicat, ad hunc finem satis esse, quod infallibilis autoritas sit in concilio uniuersali. Contra hoc est, quod huiusmodi controuersiae de fide frequenter oriuntur in ecclesia, & necesse est, ut remedium in promptu habeant paratum; at vero uniuersale concilium toties congregari & difficile & impossibile est: Rursus etiam si in promptu esset congregare concilium, quid fiet, si Patres concilii inter se dissentiant? Et quid si maior illorum pars (quod fieri potest) falsam sententiam tueatur? Tunc sane non alius relinquitur portus, nisi ut ad Christi Vicarium confugiamus, qui unus quaestiones omnes componet: atque hoc est Christi sapientiae omnino consequentissima, quae est ratio D. Thom. in hoc artic. |  | Furthermore, the conclusion is proven. Because the Supreme Pontiff ought to possess in the Church as much authority as is necessary to maintain the faithful in the unity of faith, but for this unity, an infallible power of definition in the Supreme Pontiff is necessary, therefore he possesses it. The major premise is evident in every well-established commonwealth. The minor premise, however, is proven thus: Because in the Church, questions about faith frequently arise, but truly, if there were not in the Church one judge who could settle these disputes, there would be perpetual dissensions in the Church regarding the doctrine of faith, and consequently, the unity of the Church would perish. Therefore, if someone should say that for this purpose it is sufficient that infallible authority resides in a universal council, against this is the fact that controversies of this kind concerning faith frequently arise in the Church, and it is necessary that they have a ready remedy at hand; but indeed, to convene a universal council so often is both difficult and impossible. Moreover, even if it were feasible to convene a council, what would happen if the Fathers of the council should disagree among themselves? And what if the majority of them (which can happen) should defend a false position? Then indeed, no other haven remains except to take refuge with the Vicar of Christ, who alone will settle all questions: and this is entirely most consistent with the wisdom of Christ, which is the reasoning of St. Thomas in this article. |
| Quinta conclusio. Romanus pontifex habet hanc firmam & infallibilem autoritatem in definiendis rebus fidei, quam diximus habuisse Petrum, & eius successoribus fuisse collatam. Haec conclusio mihi non videtur minus certa quam praecedens, si loquamur de Romano Episcopo quatenus de facto est summus pontifex sive humano sive divino iure. Patet enim ex dictis & ex autoribus citatis praesertim ex Turrecremata lib. 2.cap.36. quod si Romanus Episcopus est summus pontifex, quod est Christi Vicarius & Petri successor. Probatur secundo. Quia omnes haereses hactenus damnatae in ecclesia, damnatae sunt a Romano pontifice, ergo ipse est verus Christi Vicarius, alias liceret modo dubitare de illis omnibus haereticis hactenus damnatis. Probatur tertio. Quia conclusio definita est a Nicolao, vt patet 22. dist. Ofs. Vbi dicitur, quod in haeresim labitur quicunque negat ecclesiam Romanam esse caeteris praepositam. |  | Fifth conclusion. The Roman Pontiff possesses this firm and infallible authority in defining matters of faith, which we have said Peter possessed and was conferred upon his successors. This conclusion does not seem to me less certain than the preceding one, if we speak of the Roman Bishop insofar as he is in fact the Supreme Pontiff, whether by human or divine right. For it is clear from what has been said and from the cited authors, especially from Torquemada in Book 2, Chapter 36, that if the Roman Bishop is the Supreme Pontiff, then he is Christ’s Vicar and Peter’s successor. It is proven secondly: Because all heresies hitherto condemned in the Church have been condemned by the Roman Pontiff; therefore, he is the true Vicar of Christ, otherwise it would now be permissible to doubt all those heretics condemned until now. It is proven thirdly: Because the conclusion was defined by Nicholas, as is evident in Distinction 22, “Omnes.” Where it is stated that whoever denies the Roman Church is placed above the others falls into heresy. |
| Atque id ipsum dicitur in octava Synodo generali Sessione 1. & 7 & in Concilio Constantien. in Bulla Martini V. quae habetur in fine concilij. Et denique in congregatione facta ante annos centum Compluti per Alfonsium Carrillo Archiepiscopum Toletanum de mandato summi pontificis Sixti IIII. contra Petrum Oxomensem Doctorem alias Parisiensem clericum secularem, qui Salmanticae sacrae Theologiae primariae cathedrae praefectus fuit, qui solus magistrorum Dominicanae familiae seriem in eadem cathedra ab ipsius institutione praesidentium interrupit satis infeliciter. Nam eius libri simul cum cathedra in qua sedebat in media schola maiori igni traditi sunt comburendi. Huius Doctoris inter alias septima propositio, Ecclesiam Romanam posse errare in fide, quae condemnata est tanquam haeretica. Et ipse Sixtus Quartus in extravaganti contra eundem Petrum confirmavit illius congregationis acta, & eandem propositionem damnat tanquam haeresim. Quapropter ipse Petrus coactus est sententiam retractare sub tali verborum forma. Consentio Sanctae matri ecclesiae Romanae, & Sedi Apostolicae, & ore & corde confiteor, me tenere illam fidem, quam dominus Sixtus papa modernus autoritate Evangelica & Apostolica tenet, & omnes qui contra hanc fidem venerint dignos aeternae damnatione pronuncia. Huius concilij Complutensis acta, & praedictae extravagantis verba habentur in Summa conciliorum in vita & decretis Sixti Quarti. |  | And this same point is stated in the Eighth General Synod, Sessions 1 and 7, and in the Council of Constance in the Bull of Martin V, which is found at the end of the council. And finally, in the assembly held a hundred years ago at Alcalá de Henares by Alfonso Carrillo, Archbishop of Toledo, by command of the Supreme Pontiff Sixtus IV, against Pedro de Osma, a Doctor formerly of Paris and a secular cleric, who was head of the primary chair of Sacred Theology at Salamanca, and who alone rather inauspiciously interrupted the succession of masters of the Dominican family presiding in the same chair since its establishment. For his books, together with the chair in which he sat, were consigned to be burned by fire in the middle of the main school. Among other propositions of this Doctor, the seventh one—that the Roman Church could err in faith—was condemned as heretical. And Sixtus IV himself, in an extravagant constitution against the same Pedro, confirmed the acts of that assembly and condemned the same proposition as heresy. Wherefore Pedro himself was compelled to retract his opinion under this form of words: “I submit to the Holy Mother Roman Church and the Apostolic See, and I confess with mouth and heart that I hold the same faith which the Lord Sixtus, the current pope, holds by Evangelical and Apostolic authority, and I pronounce all who come against this faith worthy of eternal damnation.” The acts of this Council of Alcalá and the words of the aforementioned extravagant constitution are contained in the Summa of Councils under the life and decrees of Sixtus IV. |
| Ultimo probatur conclusio. Quia a Romana Sede & ab eius praeside non est fas appellare. Item ab eadem confirmationem suorum decretorum concilia petunt, ergo. Antecedens negari non potest a Catholico, vt praeterit Canones & historias Ecclesiasticas. Et videtur necessarium. Nam si fas esset a Romana Sede ad concilium appellare, non modica errandi haereticis daretur occasio. Consequentia vero probatur. Quia si Romanus pontifex errare posset, esset contra omnem rationem negare appellationem ab eo ad concilium, quod errare non posset. Quod si huic argumento respondeat quis, quod de facto non est fas appellare a Romano pontifice ad concilium, eo quod etiam de facto & humano iure positivo Romanus Episcopus est idem & summus pontifex, caeterum a summo pontifice non est licitum appellare; Contra hanc solutionem sic replica. Si Romanus pontifex non esset iure divino summus pontifex, sequitur, quod neque iure divino habeat infallibilitatem in definiendi rebus fidei. Rursus, ergo esset contra rationem non admittere appellationem ad concilium, in quo illa firmitas & infallibilitas iure divino existeret; imo vero salua fide posset dubitari, an ipse Romanus episcopus esset, summus pontifex, & haberet illam infallibilitatem in definiendo. |  | Finally, the conclusion is proven. Because it is not permissible to appeal from the Roman See and from its head. Likewise, councils seek confirmation of their decrees from the same See, therefore, etc. The premise cannot be denied by a Catholic, as is evident from the Canons and Ecclesiastical histories. And it seems necessary. For if it were permissible to appeal from the Roman See to a council, no small opportunity for error would be given to heretics. The consequence is indeed proven. Because if the Roman Pontiff could err, it would be against all reason to deny an appeal from him to a council, which could not err. But if anyone should respond to this argument that in fact it is not permissible to appeal from the Roman Pontiff to a council, because also in fact and by positive human law the Roman Bishop is the same as and is the Supreme Pontiff, however it is not lawful to appeal from the Supreme Pontiff; against this solution I reply thus. If the Roman Pontiff were not by divine law the Supreme Pontiff, it would follow that neither would he have by divine law infallibility in defining matters of faith. Again, therefore, it would be against reason not to admit an appeal to a council, in which that firmness and infallibility would exist by divine law; indeed, it would be possible, while preserving the faith, to doubt whether the Roman Bishop himself was the Supreme Pontiff, and whether he had that infallibility in defining. |
| Superest iis ad argumenta i principio posita respondere. |  | It remains to respond to the arguments posed at the beginning. |
| Ad primum argumentum respondetur, quod propter illud haereticus Uuicleff opinatus est, quod post Urbanum Sextum non est aliquis admittendus ut summus pontifex, sed viuendum esse Graecorum more sub propriis legibus. Quem errorem sequuti sunt postea Lutherani; fuit tamen damnatus in concilio Constantiensi Sessione 8. |  | In response to the first argument, it should be noted that because of this the heretic Wycliffe held the opinion that after Urban VI no one should be accepted as Supreme Pontiff, but that one should live according to the manner of the Greeks under their own laws. The Lutherans later followed this error; however, it was condemned in the Council of Constance, Session 8. |
| Dicendum est igitur, nullam esse rationabilem dubitationem de electione Martini Quinti. Primo, quia secundum fidem est in Ecclesia autoritas eligendi summum pontificem. Papa vero tanquam Ecclesiae caput praescribit electionis faciendae modum & determinat, per quos electio fieri debeat; ac proinde statuit, ut per solos Cardinales fieret. |  | It must therefore be said that there is no reasonable doubt concerning the election of Martin V. First, because according to the faith, the authority to elect the Supreme Pontiff resides in the Church. The Pope, indeed, as head of the Church, prescribes the method of conducting the election and determines by whom the election ought to be carried out; and accordingly established that it should be done by the Cardinals alone. |
| Quod si pontifex (quod Deus auertat) simul cum omnibus Cardinalibus peste aut gladio perirent, nihilominus certum est manere in Episcopis & in clero Romano autoritatem ad eligendum papam, aut certe ad concilium conuocandum, in quo eligeretur summus pontifex. |  | But if the pontiff (which God forbid) together with all the Cardinals were to perish by plague or sword, nevertheless it is certain that the authority to elect the pope, or certainly to convoke a council in which the Supreme Pontiff would be elected, would remain with the Bishops and the Roman clergy. |
| Atque ita factum est, quando Martinus Quintus fuit electus. Etenim cum tres simul se gererent ut summi pontifices, videlicet, Ioannes XXIII, & Gregorius XII, & Benedictus XIII, tunc industria & opera Sigismundi Imperatoris congregatum est concilium Constantiense, ubi primo interfuit Ioannes XXIII cum suis sequacibus, sibique obedientibus; deinde conuenerunt aliae duae obedientiae, & per communem consensum totius Ecclesiae depositi sunt a summo pontificatu tres supradicti; vir, & decretum est, ut simul cum Cardinalibus designarentur ex singulis nationibus, quae concilio interfuerant, sex viri, qui in electione noui pontificis ferrent suffragia pro illa vice tantum. |  | And thus it was done when Martin V was elected. For when three men simultaneously conducted themselves as Supreme Pontiffs, namely, John XXIII, Gregory XII, and Benedict XIII, then through the industry and efforts of Emperor Sigismund, the Council of Constance was assembled, where first John XXIII attended with his followers and those obedient to him; then the other two obediences convened, and by the common consensus of the whole Church, the three aforementioned were deposed from the supreme pontificate; and it was decreed that, together with the Cardinals, six men would be designated from each of the nations that participated in the council, who would cast votes in the election of the new pontiff for that occasion only. |
| Atque ita ut constat ex Sessione 41. electus est omnium consensu Martinus Quintus, Anno Domini 1417. in festo Sancti Martini. |  | And thus, as is evident from Session 41, Martin V was elected by the consensus of all, in the year of our Lord 1417, on the feast of Saint Martin. |
| Potuit igitur Ecclesia propter communem errorem facti deponere tres illos, qui dicebantur pontifices, etiam si illorum aliquis esset verus pontifex. Omnes enim tenebantur cedere iuri suo propter Ecclesiae communem utilitatem; alioquin si nollent cedere, poterant deponi ab Ecclesia, quae etiam potuit nouum pontificem creare, sicut factum est. |  | The Church was therefore able, on account of common error of fact, to depose those three who were called pontiffs, even if one of them was the true pontiff. For all of them were bound to cede their right for the common good of the Church; otherwise, if they refused to cede, they could be deposed by the Church, which could also create a new pontiff, as was done. |
| Praeterea. Etiam si a solis Cardinalibus & illis dubiis; imo falsis electus fuisset Martinus Quintus, & sine conuocatione concilij, posset nihilominus dici verus pontifex propter communem consensum Ecclesiae & errorem facti. Nam ut habetur in lege Barbarius. ff. de officio Praetoris, ubi est communis error facti, habet iurisdictionem praelatus, & omnia gesta & acta illius valent tam in ciuilibus quam in spiritualibus; unde & parochus excommunicatus etiam nominatim, si sit communis error facti, vere absoluit. Atque ita Cardinales, qui elegerunt Martinum Quintum, eo quod habebant titulum Cardinalatus & erat communis error facti, habuerunt iurisdictionem ad ferendum suffragium in electione pontificis: & sic electus esset indubitatus summus pontifex. |  | Furthermore, even if Martin V had been elected by the Cardinals alone and those of dubious or even false standing, and without the convocation of a council, he could nevertheless be called the true pontiff because of the common consensus of the Church and error of fact. For as is held in the law Barbarius (ff. de officio Praetoris), where there is common error of fact, the prelate possesses jurisdiction, and all his acts and deeds are valid both in civil and spiritual matters; hence even a parish priest who is excommunicated by name, if there is common error of fact, truly absolves. And thus the Cardinals, who elected Martin V, because they held the title of Cardinal and there was common error of fact, had jurisdiction to cast votes in the election of the pontiff: and thus the one elected would be the undoubted Supreme Pontiff. |
| Respondetur tertio, quod etiam si concedamus, quod ipsa electio Martini Quinti fuisset nulla tamen quia postmodum a tota Ecclesia acceptatus est ut pastor universalis, fuisset revera summus pontifex & consequenter eius successores. Quemadmodum etiam Gothi per tyrannidem occupaverunt primum Hispaniam, sed deinde consentiente regno fuerunt veri Reges & tales vocantur in conciliis Toletanis, praecipue in concil.5.canone 3. |  | Thirdly, it is responded that even if we concede that the election of Martin V itself was null, nevertheless, because he was subsequently accepted by the whole Church as universal pastor, he would have been in reality the Supreme Pontiff and consequently his successors as well. Just as the Goths first occupied Spain through tyranny, but then with the consent of the kingdom became true Kings and are called such in the Councils of Toledo, especially in the 5th Council, Canon 3. |
| Ad secundum argumentum respondetur, quod etiam si in Ecclesia esset aliquis putatus pontifex, qui revera non esset, nunquam tamen error ipsius definientis redundabit in Ecclesiam universalem, quia vel non definiet, vel definiet verum, vel si falsum definiet, non recipietur ab Ecclesia, sed revelabitur error definitionis vel definientis. Et hoc citra miraculum, sed secundum legem communem, quae Matthaei 16.explicatur, dum dicitur; Et portae inferi non praevalebunt adversus eam. |  | In response to the second argument, it is answered that even if there were someone in the Church who was considered to be the pontiff who in reality was not, nevertheless the error of such a person making definitions would never redound to the universal Church, because either he will not define anything, or he will define what is true, or if he defines what is false, it will not be received by the Church, but the error of the definition or of the one defining will be revealed. And this occurs without a miracle, but according to the common law, which is explained in Matthew 16, where it is said: “And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.” |
| Secundo respondetur, quod si is qui aestimatur pontifex, & revera non est, fuerit incapax Pontificatus, ut si v.g. sit foemina, quod quidam voluerunt dicere de Iohanne Octavo, vel non sit baptizatus, nullam omnino habebit iurisdictionem spiritualem. Si vero sit habilis ad pontificatum, sed eius electio fuerit nulla propter aliquem defectum, tunc habebit ex parte iurisdictionem, quam Vicarius Papae solet habere Sede vacante, non tamen habebit potestatem definiendi res fidei infallibiliter, quoniam haec in solo vero pontifice residet. |  | Secondly, it is answered that if one who is esteemed to be the pontiff, but in reality is not, should be incapable of the Pontificate—as if, for example, he were a woman (which some have wished to claim about John VIII), or he were not baptized—he would possess no spiritual jurisdiction whatsoever. If, however, he is eligible for the pontificate, but his election was null due to some defect, then he will have partial jurisdiction, similar to what the Vicar of the Pope usually has when the See is vacant, but he will not have the power to define matters of faith infallibly, since this resides in the true pontiff alone. |
| Respondent aliqui tertio, quod postquam Papa definivit aliquid tenendum secundum fidem, tunc etiam secundum fidem est asserendum, ipsum esse summum pontificem. Ut si v.g. Gregorius XIII. definiat nunc, aliquam propositionem esse tenendam secundum fidem, definit etiam simul & consequenter, se esse summum pontificem. Et eodem modo dicunt de concilio, quod simul definit conclusionem fidei, & ipsum esse concilium. Et probant. Quia conclusio fidei non potest sequi nisi ex duabus praemissis fidei, vel altera fidei, & altera cognita lumine naturae; sed conclusio quam definit Pontifex, est certa secundum fidem, & pendet ex istis praemissis, summus pontifex errare non potest, & hic est summus pontifex; sed minor non est cognita lumine naturae ergo ex fide habetur. |  | Some respond thirdly that after the Pope has defined something to be held according to faith, then it must also be asserted according to faith that he is the Supreme Pontiff. For example, if Gregory XIII now defines some proposition to be held according to faith, he simultaneously and consequently defines that he is the Supreme Pontiff. And they say the same about a council, that it simultaneously defines a conclusion of faith and [defines] itself to be a council. And they prove it thus: Because a conclusion of faith can only follow from two premises of faith, or from one premise of faith and another known by the light of natural reason; but the conclusion which the Pontiff defines is certain according to faith, and depends on these premises: “The Supreme Pontiff cannot err,” and “This man is the Supreme Pontiff.” But since the minor premise is not known by the light of nature, therefore it must be known by faith. |
| Praeterea probant a posteriori. Bene sequitur, qui habet potestatem confirmandi, & confirmat fratres in fide, est summus pontifex; sed hic confirmat fratres in fide, ergo est summus pontifex. Maior habetur Lucae 22. & minor patet ad sensum, post quam Gregorius definivit aliquam veritatem de fide. Etenim ante illam definitionem dubitabant fideles, post illam vero iam firmiter credunt, igitur illa conclusio, hic est summus pontifex, habetur secundum fidem. |  | Furthermore, they prove it a posteriori. The following argument is valid: He who has the power to confirm, and confirms the brethren in faith, is the Supreme Pontiff; but this man confirms the brethren in faith, therefore he is the Supreme Pontiff. The major premise is found in Luke 22, and the minor premise is evident to the senses after Gregory has defined some truth of faith. Indeed, before that definition the faithful were in doubt, but after it they now firmly believe; therefore, the conclusion “this man is the Supreme Pontiff” is held according to faith. |
| Probant tertio. Si summus pontifex aut concilium dum definiunt aliquam propositionem, non definirent implicite & consequenter se habere autoritatem ad definiendum, sequeretur, ultimam resolutionem in rebus fidei fieri tantum in proprium cuiusque fidelis iudicium, neque esse aliquam certam ac regulam visibilem, ad quam fiat ultima resolutio, quod videtur esse in favorem Lutheranorum. Probant sequela. Quoniam ad proprium cuiusque iudicium spectaret iudicare, sit ne hic summus pontifex, sit ne illud concilium. |  | They prove thirdly. If the Supreme Pontiff or a council, when defining some proposition, did not implicitly and consequently define themselves as having the authority to make such a definition, it would follow that the final resolution in matters of faith would rest solely on the private judgment of each individual believer, and there would be no certain and visible rule to which final resolution could be made, which seems to favor the Lutheran position. They prove the logical consequence. Because it would pertain to each person’s private judgment to determine whether this person is the Supreme Pontiff, or whether that assembly is a council. |
| Et denique confirmatur. Quia ut supra dictum est, ad fidem pertinet, ut credamus, & confiteamur, non solum esse Ecclesiam Christi in mundo, sed etiam esse hanc Ecclesiam singularem, in qua fideles militant sub uno Romano pontifice. |  | And finally, it is confirmed. Because as was stated above, it pertains to faith that we believe and confess not only that the Church of Christ exists in the world, but also that this singular Church exists, in which the faithful serve under one Roman pontiff. |
| ¶Nihilominus praedictae rationes non efficaciter convincunt. Nam prima ratio illorum, qui praedicto modo respondent, si aliquid valeret, probaret etiam, quod prius deberet esse certum secundum fidem, quod hic sit summus pontifex, quam quod conclusio definita sit certa secundum fidem. Etenim iuxta posteriorsticam doctrinam praemisse debent esse prius cognitae quam conclusio, & magis certae, ac proinde prius oportebat certo cognoscere, hunc esse summum pontificem, quam ex fide assentire conclusioni ab eo definitae, non ergo oportet expectare, ut pontifex aliquid definiat, ad hoc quod nobis sit certum secundum fidem Catholicam, quod ipse sit summus pontifex. |  | Nevertheless, the aforementioned arguments are not convincingly effective. For the first argument of those who respond in the aforementioned manner, if it were valid, would also prove that it should be certain according to faith that this person is the supreme pontiff, before the defined conclusion is certain according to faith. Indeed, according to the a posteriori doctrine, premises must be known before the conclusion, and with greater certainty; consequently, it would be necessary to know with certainty that this person is the supreme pontiff before assenting in faith to the conclusion defined by him. Therefore, we need not wait for the pontiff to define something in order to be certain according to Catholic faith that he is the supreme pontiff. |
| Sed neque secunda probatio illorum est efficax, quia potest aliquis respondere, illam propositionem esse certam secundum fidem, eo quod tota Ecclesia illam acceptat, quae errare non potest, non autem quia sit certum secundum fidem, quod ille homo singularis sit summus pontifex. |  | But neither is their second proof effective, because one could respond that the proposition is certain according to faith because the whole Church accepts it, which cannot err, but not because it is certain according to faith that this particular individual is the supreme pontiff. |
| Sed neque tertium illorum argumentum convincit. Etenim resolutio huius veritatis, Ecclesiam esse veracem & infallibilem regulam, fit tametsi ad testimonium intrinsecum Spiritus sancti etiam quo ad nos, non autem fit ad ipsammet Ecclesiam, quia, scilicet, ipsa iudicat, se esse veracem, sed quia intime nos inclinat Spiritus sanctus, ut credamus illam esse veracem in explicandis rebus fidei, iuxta illud 1. Iohan. 4. Qui est ex Deo, audit nos. Unde non opus est, quod ut aliqua propositio habeatur certa secundum fidem, colligatur per consequentiam ex illo antecedenti, iste est summus pontifex, & iste definit, & proponit hanc propositionem, ergo est de fide. Sufficiet enim nobis, quod a tota Ecclesia acceptetur tanquam certa secundum fidem, ut inde possimus iudicare, & tenere, illam esse certam secundum fidem. |  | Nor does their third argument convince. Indeed, the resolution of this truth—that the Church is a truthful and infallible rule—happens through the intrinsic testimony of the Holy Spirit as it relates to us, but it does not happen through the Church itself merely because the Church judges itself to be truthful. Rather, it is because the Holy Spirit intimately inclines us to believe that the Church is truthful in explaining matters of faith, according to 1 John 4: “He who is of God hears us.” Therefore, it is not necessary that for a proposition to be considered certain according to faith, it must be derived through a consequence from the antecedent “this person is the supreme pontiff, and this person defines and proposes this proposition, therefore it is of faith.” It will be sufficient for us that the proposition is accepted by the whole Church as certain according to faith, so that from this we can judge and hold that it is certain according to faith. |
| Quapropter ad argumentum principale possumus respondere quarto, quod etiam post summi pontificis & concilii definitionem solum habetur ex humana prudentia & evidenti inquisitione aut etiam ex infusa prudentia, cui potest subesse falsum speculative, quod hic est summus pontifex, & quod hoc est concilium rite congregatum & confirmatum. Nihilominus ipsa propositio sic definita habenda est certa secundum fidem. Ut quando aliquis praedicator fidem praedicat apud barbaros, ipsi barbari possunt credere ex fide infusa Evangelii, & tamen non assentire ex fide infusa, quod ille praedicator errare non potest. Sed ex hominis coniecturas indicant, quod ille praedicator non fallit, neque fallit in illa regulatione. Et ad argumentum in forma respondet, quod summus pontifex iste singularis habet se tanquam conditio sine qua non, non autem ut ratio credendi sit eius autoritas. |  | Therefore, to the principal argument we can respond fourthly, that even after the definition of the Supreme Pontiff and Council, it is known only through human prudence and evident inquiry, or even through infused prudence (to which falsehood may be present speculatively), that this person is the Supreme Pontiff, and that this is a duly convened and confirmed Council. Nevertheless, the proposition thus defined must be held as certain according to faith. As when some preacher proclaims the faith among barbarians, the barbarians themselves can believe the Gospel through infused faith, and yet not assent through infused faith that the preacher cannot err. Rather, they judge by human conjecture that the preacher is neither deceived nor deceives in that instruction. And to the argument in form, the response is that this particular Supreme Pontiff serves as a condition without which not [conditio sine qua non], but not in such a way that his authority is the reason for believing. |
| Verum tamen haec quarta solutio explicatione opus habet. Videtur enim ex illa sequi, quod non sit necessarium credere secundum fidem, hanc Ecclesiam in singulari esse ecclesiam Catholicam, sed quod sufficiat credere, & confiteri in communi, Ecclesiam esse catholicam. Probatur sequela. Quia haec Ecclesia singularis, non est alia, nisi quae de facto nunc est sub summo pontifice Gregorio XIII. & quae hic & nunc congregata est in hoc numero concilio v.g. Tridentino, ergo si fides immediate non inclinat ad credendum, hoc esse Concilium, & hunc esse pontificem, sequitur, quod non inclinet ad credendum in singulari, hanc esse Ecclesiam catholicam. Probatur consequentia. Quia non potest aliunde dignosci haec Ecclesia in singulari hic & nunc nisi per huiusmodi conditiones & circumstantias singulares: |  | However, this fourth solution requires explanation. For it seems to follow from it that it is not necessary to believe according to faith that this particular Church is the Catholic Church, but that it suffices to believe and confess in general that the Church is catholic. The consequence is proven thus: Because this particular Church is none other than the one which now exists under Pope Gregory XIII, and which here and now is gathered in this particular council, e.g., the Council of Trent. Therefore, if faith does not immediately incline one to believe that this is the Council and this is the pontiff, it follows that faith does not incline one to believe in particular that this is the Catholic Church. The consequence is proven because this particular Church here and now cannot be recognized except through such particular conditions and circumstances. |
| Ad hoc argumentum respondetur, nego sequelam. Non enim haec ecclesia singularis individuatur per se, per hoc quod militat nunc sub isto pontifice singulari, neque per hoc quod congregata est in isto concilio. Etenim ante istum pontificem & ante hoc concilium erat haec Ecclesia: & similiter finito concilio & mortuo pontifice manet haec eadem numero Ecclesia, ergo eius individuatio non consistit in praedictis circumstantiis, quanvis sint quaedam signa ad investigandum, quaenam & ubi sit Ecclesia, quae dicitur catholica. Dicendum ergo, quod Ecclesia individuatur, per hoc quod est congregatio fidelium subdita successori Petri & Romano pontifici de facto, sive iste numero sive alius sit iste Romanus pontifex. Unde quandiu putatur esse talis hic homo in singulari, tunc Ecclesia quae subditur illi, est haec singularis & catholica Ecclesia, quae prudenter iudicat & interdum credit & moraliter, quod hic homo sit rite electus supposita fide quae docet, esse in Ecclesia potestatem eligendi pontificem successorem Petri. |  | To this argument I respond by denying the consequence. For this particular Church is not individuated per se by the fact that it now exists under this particular pontiff, nor by the fact that it is gathered in this council. Indeed, before this pontiff and before this council, this Church existed; and similarly, when the council ends and when the pontiff dies, this same numerical Church remains. Therefore, its individuation does not consist in the aforementioned circumstances, although these are certain signs for investigating which and where is the Church that is called catholic. It must be said, therefore, that the Church is individuated by the fact that it is a congregation of the faithful subject to the successor of Peter and to the Roman pontiff in fact, whether this particular man or another is the Roman pontiff. Hence, as long as such a man in particular is considered to be the pope, then the Church which is subject to him is this particular and catholic Church, which prudently judges and sometimes believes morally that this man has been duly elected, presupposing the faith which teaches that there exists in the Church the power to elect a pontiff as successor to Peter. |
| Dicimus ergo, quod fides & Spiritus sanctus immediate inclinat ad credendum, hanc quae nunc dicitur Romana Ecclesia, esse veram & catholicam Christi Ecclesiam, sive iste homo singularis sit vere pontifex Romanus sive non. Hoc enim pendet ex quibusdam circumstantiis, quae possunt deficere, ut v.g. necesse est illum esse baptizatum, & fortassis non est baptizatus. Similiter pendet ex eo, quod iste sit vir, & fortassis est faemina. Sicut vulgo dicitur de Iohanne VIII. Caeterum si res ita se habet, quod hoc concilium fuerit congregatum & confirmatum a vero pontifice, tunc non solum humana fides causat singularem assensum veritatis definitae in tali concilio, sed etiam fides & Spiritus sanctus inclinat ad assensum illius veritatis sic definitae. Si autem re vera non sit iste, qui putatur esse verus pontifex, & concilium non sit, ut putatur esse rite congregatum & confirmatum, tunc fidelis particularis, aut aliqua particularis congregatio poterit falli, putans se assentire ex fide infusa illi propositioni definitae, cui tamen revera non assentit nisi ex fide humana & humanis coniecturis, ex quibus fallitur. Nunquam tamen admittendum est, totam ecclesiam falli acceptando huiusmodi definitionem concilii in notitiis. Si tota Ecclesia acceptaverit, signum certissimum erit, quod propositio definita vera est, & ad fidem pertinet, etiam si ille qui habebat ut summus pontifex, non esset verus pontifex. |  | Therefore we say that faith and the Holy Spirit directly incline one to believe that this which is now called the Roman Church is the true and catholic Church of Christ, whether this particular man is truly the Roman Pontiff or not. For this depends on certain circumstances which can be lacking, as for example, it is necessary that he be baptized, and perhaps he is not baptized. Similarly, it depends on the fact that this person is a man, and perhaps it is a woman. As is commonly said of John VIII. However, if the situation is such that this council was assembled and confirmed by the true pontiff, then not only does human faith cause a singular assent to the truth defined in such a council, but also faith and the Holy Spirit incline one to assent to that truth thus defined. But if in reality he who is thought to be the true pontiff is not, and the council is not, as it is thought to be, duly assembled and confirmed, then a particular faithful individual, or some particular congregation, could be deceived, thinking they are assenting by infused faith to that defined proposition, to which, however, in reality they assent only from human faith and human conjectures, by which they are deceived. Nevertheless, it should never be admitted that the whole Church is deceived in accepting such a definition of a council made public. If the whole Church has accepted it, it will be a most certain sign that the defined proposition is true and pertains to the faith, even if he who was regarded as the supreme pontiff was not the true pontiff. |
| Nihilominus omnibus supradictis non obstantibus valde temerarium esset & scandalosum, si postquam Ecclesia acceptavit aliquem ut summum pontificem, negaret aliquis, illum esse summum pontificem verum, nisi ostenderet illum non esse baptizatum, aut non esse virum: alioquin non solum esset vehementer suspectus de haeresi, sed etiam ut haereticus merito puniretur. Quia videretur negare, in Ecclesia esse potestatem eligendi summum pontificem Petri successorem. Notissime disputandus est moralis casus, quod aliquis ascendat ad culmen pontificatus, absque hoc quod sit baptizatus, eo vel maxime quod ad divinam providentiam spectare creditur, ut non permittat hominem non baptizatum ascendere ad sacerdotium, & multo minus ad summum pontificatum. Caeterum quod dicitur de Iohanne illo fuisse faeminam, incertum est. Et quando id semel acciderit, non tamen admittendum est, quod toti Ecclesiae proponat aliquem errorem tanquam de fide credendum, & quod ab Ecclesia acceptetur. |  | Nevertheless, despite all the aforementioned points, it would be highly reckless and scandalous if, after the Church has accepted someone as the Supreme Pontiff, anyone were to deny that he is the true Supreme Pontiff, unless they could demonstrate that he was not baptized or not a man. Otherwise, such a person would not only be vehemently suspected of heresy but would also deservedly be punished as a heretic. For he would seem to deny that the Church possesses the power to elect a Supreme Pontiff as Peter’s successor. It is a most well-known case for moral disputation, that someone might ascend to the height of the pontificate without being baptized, especially since it is believed to pertain to divine providence that it does not permit an unbaptized man to ascend to the priesthood, and much less to the supreme pontificate. Moreover, what is said about that “John” having been a woman is uncertain. And even if this had happened once, it is nevertheless not to be admitted that such a person would propose to the whole Church some error as though it were to be believed as a matter of faith, and that it would be accepted by the Church. |
| Et si quis objiciat, quod fidei potest in Ecclesia, ut hostia non consecrata adoretur ut consecrata ex affectu religionis verae, ergo fieri potest, quod ex affectu fidei credatur hic homo esse summus pontifex, & tamen non sit verus pontifex. Ad hoc respondetur, quod fides nullo modo potest inclinare ad falsum neque practicum neque speculativum, ut in superioribus dictum est. At vero virtus religionis sicut & prudentiae etiam infusae semper inclinant ad verum practicum, non tamen semper inclinant ad id, quod speculative verum est. Est etiam alia differentia. Quia facilis est error circa hanc hostiam in singulari, an sit consecrata propter oblivionem sacerdotis. At vero circa summum pontificem non est ita facile errare in singulari, an hic sit summus pontifex, qui ab universa Ecclesia acceptatur ut talis: Et per hoc patet ad confirmationem secundi argumenti principalis. |  | And if anyone should object that it is possible in the Church for an unconsecrated host to be adored as consecrated out of an impulse of true religion, therefore it can happen that out of an impulse of faith, this man might be believed to be the Supreme Pontiff, and yet not be the true pontiff. To this we respond that faith can in no way incline toward falsehood, neither practical nor speculative, as has been stated above. However, the virtue of religion, just like that of prudence (even infused prudence), always inclines toward practical truth, but does not always incline toward that which is speculatively true. There is also another difference. For error is easy regarding this particular host, whether it is consecrated, due to the forgetfulness of the priest. But concerning the Supreme Pontiff, it is not so easy to err in the particular case of whether he who is accepted by the universal Church as such is the Supreme Pontiff. And through this, the confirmation of the second principal argument is addressed. |
| Ad tertium argumentum respondent aliqui, negando antecedens. Alii concedunt, posse quidem esse haereticum pontificem, sed non admittunt, quod interim definiat aliquid toti Ecclesiae secundum fidem credendum. Nihilominus isti autores videntur asserere miraculum, quale est, quod aliquis sit verus Christi Vicarius, & quod non possit confirmare fratres in fide. Nos ergo consequenter loquendo ad ea quae praediximus, respondemus, quod quemadmodum Caiphas prophetavit nesciens quid diceret, cum esset pontifex anni illius, ut habetur Iohan. 11. Ita etiam summus pontifex haereticus quandiu fungitur officio pontificis, poterit definire veritatem contra propriam sententiam ex instinctu Spiritus sancti, imo summus pontifex haereticus intelliget, id quod definit esse contrarium propriae sententiae, & nihilominus definiet illud ordinante Spiritu sancto, qui adsistit officio summi Pontificatus. |  | To the third argument, some respond by denying the antecedent. Others concede that a pontiff can indeed be a heretic, but they do not admit that he might meanwhile define something to be believed according to faith by the whole Church. Nevertheless, these authors seem to assert a miracle, such as that someone could be the true Vicar of Christ and yet be unable to confirm the brethren in faith. We, therefore, speaking consistently with what we have already stated, respond that just as Caiaphas prophesied without knowing what he was saying, since he was the high priest of that year, as is recorded in John 11, so also a heretical supreme pontiff, as long as he functions in the office of pontiff, could define truth contrary to his own opinion through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, a heretical supreme pontiff would understand that what he defines is contrary to his own opinion, and nevertheless he would define it through the ordination of the Holy Spirit, who assists the office of the Supreme Pontificate. |
| Ad quartum argumentum respondent quidam concedentes maiorem, sed negant minorem. Alii vero e contra negant maiorem, & concedunt minorem. Utrique tamen aiunt, quod nunquam definiet falsum summus Pontifex, vel quia semper adhibebit sufficientem diligentiam, vel quia si non adhibuerit, etiam si ille peccet, non tamen permittet Deus, quod definiat falsum. Et ratio istorum est, quia privilegium quod Christus Petro concessit, in hunc modum habet; Ego rogavi pro te, ut non deficiat fides tua. Non dixit, ut non deficiat prudentia tua, ergo poterit esse negligens in adhibenda debita diligentia. Item probant, quia alias nullum videretur privilegium concessum Petro. Etenim quicunque diligens fuerit ad inquirendum de fide, inveniet veritatem. Sed haec sententia non videtur respondere. Primo quia assistentia Spiritus sancti non est concessa Petro & successoribus simul per immediatam illuminationem, sicut autoribus sacrae Scripturae astitit Spiritus sanctus: alias definitio pontificis esset sacra scriptura, si immediate haberetur ex revelatione Spiritus sancti facta pontifici. Dicendum ergo videtur, quod requiratur diligens inquisitio, ut Pontifex postea definiat, quid sit certum secundum fidem. Item probatur hoc ex usu, quem semper observavit Ecclesia praemittens disputationes in conciliis, ut postea definiantur, quae secundum fidem tenenda sunt. Ipsi etiam summi Pontifices, si quando sine concilio generali volunt aliquid definire, semper praemittunt consultationem Theologorum. Quod si quis dicat, hoc ita fieri, quia praeceptum est de adhibenda tali diligentia, non quia simpliciter sit necessaria. In contrarium est, quia tale praeceptum non aliunde potest colligi, nisi quia alias Pontifex exponeret se periculo errandi, nisi talem diligentiam adhiberet. Etenim si nulla posita industria neque concilium neque Pontifex errare possent, non esset temerarium non adhibere talem diligentiam, neque esset unde colligeretur praeceptum illam adhibendi. Dicimus ergo ad quartum argumentum, quod Papa & concilium non possunt relinquere huiusmodi diligentiam, neque relinquet illam unquam, cum res fidei definire parant. Et hoc est tam certum, quam certum est, non posse concilium & Pontificem errare in definiendis rebus fidei. Nam qui concessit infallibilitatem finis, contulit etiam infallibilitatem mediorum, quae necessaria sunt ad finem. Praeterea. Si hanc certitudinem non haberemus, facile possent haeretici definitiones Pontificum & conciliorum calumniari, dicentes non adhibitam fuisse diligentiam necessariam, neque revelationem factam esse immediate a Deo circa tales definitiones. |  | To the fourth argument, some respond by conceding the major premise but denying the minor. Others, conversely, deny the major premise and concede the minor. Both, however, maintain that the Supreme Pontiff will never define something false, either because he will always employ sufficient diligence, or because, even if he fails to do so and thereby sins, God will not permit him to define falsehood. The rationale of these theologians is that the privilege which Christ granted to Peter was expressed thus: “I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail.” He did not say, “that your prudence may not fail,” therefore the Pope might be negligent in employing due diligence. They further argue that otherwise no privilege would seem to have been granted to Peter. For anyone who is diligent in investigating matters of faith will discover the truth. But this position does not seem to provide an adequate response. First, because the assistance of the Holy Spirit was not granted to Peter and his successors through immediate illumination, as the Holy Spirit assisted the authors of Sacred Scripture; otherwise, a papal definition would be Sacred Scripture, if it were obtained immediately from a revelation of the Holy Spirit made to the pontiff. It seems, therefore, that we must say that diligent inquiry is required before the Pontiff can define what is certain according to faith. This is further proven from the practice which the Church has always observed of preceding conciliar definitions with disputations, so that afterward it may be defined what is to be held according to faith. Even the Supreme Pontiffs themselves, when they wish to define something without a general council, always precede it with a consultation of theologians. If someone should say that this is done because such diligence is prescribed, not because it is absolutely necessary, the contrary is evident because such a precept cannot be deduced from anywhere else except from the fact that otherwise the Pontiff would expose himself to the danger of error if he did not employ such diligence. Indeed, if neither council nor Pontiff could err regardless of the industry applied, it would not be reckless to omit such diligence, nor would there be any basis from which to deduce the precept to employ it. We respond, therefore, to the fourth argument that the Pope and council cannot omit this kind of diligence, nor will they ever omit it when they prepare to define matters of faith. And this is as certain as it is certain that the council and the Pontiff cannot err in defining matters of faith. For He who granted infallibility regarding the end also conferred infallibility regarding the means necessary to that end. Furthermore, if we did not have this certainty, heretics could easily calumniate the definitions of Pontiffs and councils, saying that the necessary diligence was not employed, nor was revelation made immediately by God concerning such definitions. |
| Et ad argumenta oppositae sententiae respondetur, quod in illo loco Lucae 22. dum promisit Christus Petro fidem indeficientem, consequenter etiam promisit necessaria media ad huiusmodi infallibilitatem fidei conservandam. |  | And to the arguments of the opposing opinion, it is answered that in that passage of Luke 22, when Christ promised Peter an unfailing faith, he consequently also promised the necessary means for preserving this kind of infallibility of faith. |
| Ad secundum argumentum illius sententiae respondetur, quod particularis homo negligens esse poterit in inquirenda fidei veritate. Et si fuerit sufficienter diligens adhuc errare poterit errore inculpabili circa veritatem fidei. Caeterum privilegium Petro & successoribus concessum illud est, quod nullo modo possent negligentes esse in adhibenda necessaria diligentia, & rursus quod adhibita tali diligentia nullo pacto possint errare in definienda veritate fidei errore culpabili neque inculpabili. Habemus ergo, quod haec conditionalis vera est, si Papa non adhibuerit sufficientem diligentiam ad definiendas res fidei, errare poterit. Sed antecedens est impossibile supposita Evangelica doctrina, & ideo non est adipiscendum. Quemadmodum in statu innocentiae conceditur haec conditionalis, si homo se proijceret in ignem, combureretur. Sed tamen antecedens non admittitur pro illo statu. Ita pro statu Ecclesiae militantis non admittitur, quod summus Pontifex non adhibeat sufficientem diligentiam ante definitionem veritatis fidei. |  | To the second argument of that opinion, it is answered that a particular man may be negligent in inquiring after the truth of faith. And even if he has been sufficiently diligent, he may still err by an inculpable error concerning the truth of faith. However, the privilege granted to Peter and his successors is such that they could in no way be negligent in employing the necessary diligence, and moreover that, having employed such diligence, they could in no manner err in defining the truth of faith, neither by culpable nor inculpable error. We hold, therefore, that this conditional statement is true: if the Pope has not employed sufficient diligence in defining matters of faith, he could err. But the antecedent is impossible given the Gospel doctrine, and therefore it is not to be admitted. Just as in the state of innocence this conditional statement is granted: if man were to throw himself into fire, he would be burned. Yet the antecedent is not admitted for that state. Likewise, for the state of the Church militant, it is not admitted that the Supreme Pontiff would not employ sufficient diligence before defining a truth of faith. |
| Ex dictis sequitur, qualiter intelligenda sit tertia conclusio principalis, in qua dictum est, quod in publico fidei iudicio non est distinguenda Apostolica sedes ab Apostolico Praeside. Ubi etiam diximus contra Alfonsum de Castro, quod summus Pontifex non solum errare non potest. Hoc ita intelligendum est, quod definitio quidem ad solum Pontificem pertinere debeat, ita ut non sit necessaria Cardinalium definitio, non tamen negamus, consultationem praemittendam esse ante definitionem. Et similiter est intelligenda quarta conclusio principalis. |  | From what has been said, it follows how the third principal conclusion should be understood, in which it was stated that in the public judgment of faith, the Apostolic See should not be distinguished from the Apostolic President. Wherein we also stated, against Alfonso de Castro, that the Supreme Pontiff not only cannot err. This should be understood in the sense that the definition ought to pertain to the Pontiff alone, such that the Cardinals’ definition is not necessary; nevertheless, we do not deny that consultation should precede definition. And the fourth principal conclusion should be understood in a similar manner. |
| Ad quintum argumentum respondetur, quod quanvis disputationis gratia admitteretur, concilium esse supra papam, & autoritatem papae a concilio derivari, (de quo iam diximus, quam sit scandalosum & temerarium) nihilominus asserendum esset, quod pontifex habet firmam autoritatem ad definiendum res fidei. Et ratio est, quia hoc ipsum expedit ad bonam & necessariam ecclesiae gubernationem, eo quod concilium non facile congregari potest: quemadmodum in civili republica Rex habet autoritatem firmam interpretandi leges, ut habetur in lege 1.ff.de constitu.Principum, & tamen ipse Rex a republica autoritatem accepit talem, qualem in principe oportebat esse ad ipsius reipub.bonam & necessariam gubernationem. Secundo respondetur ad argumentum negando minorem, videlicet, quod concilium sit supra papam. Et ad probationem ex concilio Constantiensi & Basiliensi respondetur, quod ea concilia cum illud definierunt, erant acephala, hoc est, sine capite: imo Basiliense fuit coniuratio contra summum pontificem. Caeterum quod Martinus V.approbaverit acta concilij Constant. non universaliter intelligendus est, sed eo pacto quo ipse se explicat in Bulla confirmationis praedictae, quod huiusmodi approbatio se extendat ad definita, contra haereticos. De qua re vide Turrecrem. qui concilio interfuit lib.2.Summae c.99.& 100.& Caiet.in opusc.de autoritate papae & cicilij cap.8.& 9.& in apologia par.2.cap.11.& in quadam oratione de synodorum differentia habita in Concil.Later.& Magistrum Cano lib.5.de locis cap.ultim, ad 8.& 9. argumentum. |  | In response to the fifth argument, it is answered that even if, for the sake of argument, it were admitted that a council is above the pope, and that papal authority is derived from a council (about which we have already stated how scandalous and rash it is), nevertheless it must be asserted that the pontiff has firm authority to define matters of faith. The reason is that this very arrangement is expedient for the good and necessary governance of the Church, since a council cannot be easily convened. Similarly, in a civil republic, the King has firm authority to interpret laws, as stated in the first law of the Constitutions of Princes, and yet the King himself has received such authority from the republic as was necessary for a prince to possess for the good and necessary governance of the republic itself. Secondly, the argument is answered by denying the minor premise, namely, that a council is above the pope. And to the proof from the Councils of Constance and Basel, it is answered that these councils, when they defined this, were acephalous, that is, without a head; indeed, the Council of Basel was a conspiracy against the Supreme Pontiff. Furthermore, concerning the fact that Martin V approved the acts of the Council of Constance, this should not be understood universally, but in the manner which he himself explains in the Bull of confirmation mentioned above, namely that such approval extends to definitions against heretics. On this matter, see Torquemada, who was present at the council, in his Summa, Book 2, chapters 99 and 100; and Cajetan in his treatise On the Authority of the Pope and Council, chapters 8 and 9, and in his Apology, part 2, chapter 11, and in a certain oration On the Difference of Synods delivered at the Lateran Council; and Master Cano in Book 5 of De Locis Theologicis, final chapter, on the 8th and 9th arguments. |
| Ad sextum argumentum respondetur, quod ut iam diximus, summus pontifex si solus ipse definiret seclusa consultatione, errare posset, sed antecedens huius conditionalis non est admittendum. Caeterum si cum dicimus, quod solus pontifex definiat, excludamus duntaxat consortium Cardin.definientium, aut congregationem concilij, verum est quod solus papa definiens non potest errare. |  | To the sixth argument, we respond that, as we have already stated, the Supreme Pontiff could err if he alone were to make a definition without consultation; however, the antecedent of this conditional statement is not to be admitted. Moreover, if when we say that the Pontiff alone defines, we merely exclude the participation of the Cardinals in the defining process, or the convocation of a council, it is true that the Pope defining alone cannot err. |
| Ad argumentum igitur in forma negatur consequentia, quia concilia congregantur triplici de causa convenientissima. Primo quidem, quia summus pontifex pro ipsius rei, de qua est disceptatio, gravitate debet plures vel pauciores consiliarios consulere, & idcirco quando quaestiones gravissimae aut haereses oriuntur in Ecclesia, merito congregantur concilia generalia, ut catholici episcopi summum pontificem sicut partes totum defendant, atque tueantur. Cuius rei exemplum & quasi prototypum habemus in concilio 1. Hierosolymitano, quod circa gravissimam quaestionem definiendam congregatum est, videlicet, utrum legalia simul cum Evangelio servanda forent? Ubi D.Iacobus, qui erat Episcopus Hierosolymitanus, postquam Petrus sententiam de cessatione legalium protulerat, confirmavit illam ex testimonio Prophetarum, ut patet Actor.15. Secunda causa quare concilia congregantur, est, quia in illis non solum agitur de dogmatibus fidei, sed etiam de moribus reformandis, ad quam rem multum valet episcoporum consilium atque iudicium. Tertia denique causa est, quare concilia congregantur, videlicet, ad confusionem haereticorum, dum multorum episcoporum & doctorum iudicium adversus illos objicitur, quod multum valet ad fidelium aedificationem. Suavius namque a populo Christiano acceptantur, quae in conciliis definiuntur, et a pontifice confirmantur quae ea quae a solo pontifice statuuntur, tam in rebus fidei definiendis, quam etiam in Christiani populi moribus componendis. |  | To the argument, therefore, in form the consequence is denied, because councils are convened for three most fitting reasons. First, because the Supreme Pontiff, due to the gravity of the matter under discussion, ought to consult many or few advisors, and therefore when most grave questions or heresies arise in the Church, general councils are rightly convened, so that Catholic bishops may defend and protect the Supreme Pontiff as parts protect the whole. Of this we have an example and almost prototype in the First Council of Jerusalem, which was gathered to define a most grave question, namely, whether the legal observances ought to be kept together with the Gospel. There St. James, who was Bishop of Jerusalem, after Peter had pronounced the sentence concerning the cessation of legal requirements, confirmed it from the testimony of the Prophets, as is evident in Acts 15. The second reason why councils are convened is because in them not only are dogmas of faith addressed, but also the reformation of morals, for which purpose the counsel and judgment of bishops is of great value. The third reason why councils are convened is for the confounding of heretics, when the judgment of many bishops and doctors is presented against them, which greatly contributes to the edification of the faithful. For what is defined in councils and confirmed by the Pontiff is more agreeably accepted by the Christian people than what is established by the Pontiff alone, both in matters of defining the faith and in ordering the morals of the Christian people. |
| Ad septimum argumentum respondetur, quod si quando videatur pontifex in suis decretis errasse, hoc interpretandum est de errore personali, et non de errore qui ab illo, ut exercente summi pontificis officium, dimanaverit: Sed dicit aliquis, quo pacto dignoscemus, quando pontifex loquitur ut persona particularis, vel sicut Doctor, et quando sicut pontifex definit? Et similis interrogatio fieri potest de ipso concilio, videlicet, quae nota erit ad intelligendum, quae nam sit concilii definitio circa dogma fidei? et quaenam sit definitio vel assertio Doctorum et episcoporum, quatenus sunt personae particulares? Ad hoc respondetur, quod talia signa certa habere possumus. Primum quidem si dicatur: Qui oppositum senserit, aut dixerit anathema sit. Secundum si dicatur: Qui contrarium senserit, tanquam haereticus habeatur. Tertium si talis definitio tanquam ab omnibus fidelibus acceptanda et credenda sicut dogma fidei expresse proponatur. Quartum, si dicatur: De consilio fratrum hoc vel illud definimus: Si autem nullum praedictorum signorum fuerit interpositum, non est omnibus modis ipsa pontificis definitio infallibilis, etiam si pontifex aliquid absolute proferat, et in volumine iuris suam pronuntiationem inserat. Qua in re falsus est Alfonsus de Castro libro 1. adversus haereses capite 4. Putavit enim, quod quando summus pontifex suam sententiam iuri canonico inserebat, tunc loquebatur ex autoritate Pontificia; atque ita opinabatur, quod solus papa errare poterat in definiendis rebus fidei, nisi de consilio Cardinalium aliquid definiret. Quae vero in corpore iuris habentur consequenter tenetur dicere, quod omnia sunt definita de consilio Cardinalium. Observandum tamen est circa praedicta, temerarium esse, ea quae in decretis concilii generalis aut provincialis a summo pontifice confirmati definiuntur, negare praesertim in rebus quae ad doctrinam fidei attinent, etiam si in huiusmodi decretis nullum praedictorum signorum adiiciatur. Caeterum consueverunt generalia concilia ea, quae in decretis fusius explicata sunt, in canones breviores reducere, in quibus anathema oppositum sentientibus dici solet. Id quod in concilio Tridentino expresse factum est. Hactenus de hac gravissima difficultate dictum sit sub correctione sacrosanctae Ecclesiae Romanae, in qua, sola Christi vicarius et Petri successor praesidet. |  | In response to the seventh argument, it should be noted that whenever the Pontiff appears to have erred in his decrees, this is to be interpreted as a personal error, and not as an error stemming from him while exercising the office of Supreme Pontiff. But someone may ask: How shall we discern when the Pontiff speaks as a private person or as a Doctor, and when he defines something as the Pontiff? A similar question can be asked about the council itself, namely, what will be the indication for understanding which is a definition of the council concerning a dogma of faith, and which is a definition or assertion of Doctors and bishops insofar as they are private persons? To this, we respond that we can have certain definite signs. First, if it is said: “Let anyone who holds the opposite opinion or speaks contrary to this be anathema.” Second, if it is said: “Let anyone who holds a contrary opinion be considered a heretic.” Third, if such a definition is expressly proposed as one to be accepted and believed by all the faithful as a dogma of faith. Fourth, if it is said: “With the counsel of our brethren, we define this or that.” If, however, none of the aforementioned signs is present, the definition of the Pontiff is not in all ways infallible, even if the Pontiff pronounces something absolutely and inserts his pronouncement in the body of law. In this matter, Alfonso de Castro was mistaken in his first book against heresies, chapter 4. For he thought that when the Supreme Pontiff inserted his judgment into canon law, he was then speaking with Pontifical authority; and thus he was of the opinion that the Pope alone could err in defining matters of faith, unless he defined something with the counsel of the Cardinals. Consequently, he is compelled to say that all things contained in the body of law are defined with the counsel of Cardinals. Nevertheless, it should be observed regarding the aforementioned points that it is rash to deny what is defined in the decrees of a general council or of a provincial council confirmed by the Supreme Pontiff, especially in matters pertaining to the doctrine of faith, even if none of the aforementioned signs is added to such decrees. Furthermore, general councils are accustomed to reduce what has been more extensively explained in the decrees to shorter canons, in which anathema is usually pronounced against those holding contrary opinions. This has been expressly done in the Council of Trent. Let this suffice concerning this most serious difficulty, subject to the correction of the Holy Roman Church, in which alone the Vicar of Christ and successor of Peter presides. |